Society And its Purpose
Book 3 - Determining the End of Civil Societies
CHAPTER 3
The soundness and corruption of the practical reason of the masses during the four stages of civil society
309. Let us now review the case of populations which are incorrupt before the foundation of civil society. By retaining a certain amount of free, intellectual activity, these populations are fit to unite in civil societies; their power of understanding enables them to conceive the advantage they would gain by this and, therefore, to determine some good which serves as the proximate end of the society they intend to establish amongst themselves.
310. We should note, moreover, that such association, which presupposes a degree of primitive incorruption, is itself extremely useful both for intellectual development and the moral betterment of the families who unite. I add `for moral betterment’ because the establishment of a political society between families or individuals in these families provides a new, useful direction to all the passions as the new society becomes the fixed aim of the attention and thoughts of all.
From the moment the city-state is founded, the intellect sees before it a new, great object for which it has to work. The members’ previous unregulated efforts and customs necessarily come under a rule and order; the affections are nourished by a noble desire to develop and obtain common prosperity, which is the common good sought by the association. This would explain how Romulus’ insignificant offspring evolved so quickly and almost magically into a solid people with exemplary customs. Later, the outcasts of Europe established in the New World flourishing colonies and well-ordered States in which respect for laws together with love of order, work and all civil and domestic virtues took root. In the light of these things, it is not to be wondered that all the traditions and memories of remotest antiquity are unanimous in asserting the presence of natural goodness when a civil community is at its first stage of association.
311. The further we go back in antiquity, the more frequently we find simple customs, frugality and austerity of life, uprightness of mind and integrity of heart. In a word, the goodness we meet in primitive nature would convince us that human beings are good from their origin, were it not for the clear, though few, indications of human corruption that we find by careful consideration of those first stages. And, of course, we have before us examples of populations that have fallen into the saddest depravity almost from their first existence on earth, as we saw in the previous chapter. Moreover, the phenomenon of good customs present in the infancy of nations is explained easily enough if we realise that even the germs of corruption need as much time and opportunity to develop and show themselves as do the phenomena of virtue and wisdom. The aberrations of instinct, although scarcely perceivable at first, become ever greater as humanity grows older; all the seeds in humanity germinate and develop with the various stages of society.
312. Let us take one example: the function assigned by nature to the instinct of pleasure and pain. As we said, this function serves to indicate to the animal what is useful and what is damaging to its habitual constitution. From the very beginning, this instinct must have been fallacious to some degree. In other words, it must have indicated falsely what was good or harmful to our constitution. In making certain things too pleasurable or not pleasurable enough to us, it showed them more or less useful than they actually were; it made them too painful or not painful enough, it showed them more or less harmful than they actually were. If we then go on to abuse the pleasures falsified to some extent by faulty instinct, pleasure itself stimulates the instinct of pleasure. Finally the stimulated instinct acquires the prevalent force over the will and the understanding which leads to the advanced corruption found throughout the whole human being.(95)
313. This natural law, in virtue of which the innately corrupt germ, scarcely noticeable at the beginning, grows as humanity develops, causes the gradual corruption of the practical reason of the masses in civil societies.
314. Here, we have to note four stages in which this practical reason, always intent on the most immediate and present good, comes to determine in different ways the proximate end of society, that is, the aim which the complex will of the members intends and desires.(96) At each stage there is a sound condition followed by a corrupt condition. We can now begin to sketch the characteristics of these stages.
315. As long as there is question of founding civil society, defending it against external enemies and regulating it with internal laws, the minds and wills of all its members are dedicated to these noble aims, which are so helpful to the moral condition of the human spirit. At this first stage, the practical reason of the masses determines the proximate end of the society and social activity, which it makes consist in the very existence of the society. The newly-born society is the object of the love, study and care of all. As we said elsewhere, this is a moral and pre-eminently patriotic stage in the life of a society. A special kind of common satisfaction and contentment corresponds in the members to the good or proximate end as this is gradually achieved.
316. When the end has been achieved, and the society founded, strengthened by arms and furnished with laws, the social will, that is, the reason of the masses, is bound to turn naturally to another object and thus determine in some other way the proximate end of social action. Normally this end is determined by making it consist in the attainment of power and glory for the fatherland. Already at this second stage the proximate end or good to which people tend is neither as pure nor as moral as at the first stage. It is now a question of being on the offensive, not the defensive; of conquest, not avoiding defeat; commanding others for the sake of one’s own advantage, not laws useful for self and the commonalty of the citizens. The laws which first regulated the citizens were highly charged with social benevolence because they tended necessarily to the common good of the members; now, because they aim at dominion over foreigners, it is utility, not social benevolence, which dictates ordinances and laws. The relationship of dominion and servitude is introduced into society. The sole relationship of brotherhood no longer rules as it did; the social bond has been entwined, ivy-like, with the bond of cold, hard ownership. We should not be surprised, at this stage, to see true virtues decrease and give way to other false, apparent, impressive and popular virtues, despite the presence of military heroes and wise counsellors with profound convictions. Customs deteriorate rapidly as ambition and glory come to hold sway. Patriotism, which seems more ardent than at the first stage, actually loses its purity and pristine legitimacy. In such a state of things, satisfaction and contentment are achieved with difficulty; the longing for power and the burning desire for glory become unquenchable, and the practical reason of the masses loses its way in the midst of delusion.
317. With the State now powerful and glorious, the practical reason of the masses once more changes direction and moves eagerly towards love of wealth which, together with power, has entered society. This love of wealth can be united with productive work, commerce and other decent ways of enrichment, or it can be a love of false wealth, satisfying its longings by means of theft and rapine.
318. The love of wealth is less dangerous in the first case. Productive work requires use of the intellect, which keeps the intellective faculties alive. However, it is practically impossible not to go to excess in wanting to enrich oneself, at least with the passage of time, and not to become insatiable. In this case, contentment of spirit, the supreme end of society, is impossible.
319. The final result, if a powerful, easy-going people loves wealth solely as a means towards luxury and pleasure, is a state of moral perversion and corruption. As I have said,(97) these very pleasures are still desired for some time by the society as a whole. Soon, however, each person desires them for himself alone; selfishness takes the place of benevolence. External society goes on, but only until it crumbles before some slight collision; internal, true society has perished. In this final condition, the proximate end of society is factually non-existent. The difference between the condition of savages and that of citizens who have arrived at ultimate corruption is this: the corruption of savages precedes the existence of a society, that of citizens comes after the existence of the society. As a result, the society continues for some time in its exterior forms despite the corruption of its members.(98)
320. The practical reason of the masses therefore determines the proximate end of society differently in society’s four different stages.
At the first stage, the proximate end of society is made to consist in the society itself, whose existence is sought as the immediate good; at the second stage, in power; at the third, in social wealth; at the fourth, in pleasure. Only the first stage can be called a stage(99) of social incorruption; only then do the reason and will of the masses tend towards the substance of society, that is, to an absolutely upright good. At the first stage, power is still absent, and with it the desire to overcome and dominate others; justice reigns. Wealth is absent, and with it covetousness; a frugal, simple life reigns. There is no luxury or refined pleasure; moderation and sound living reigns.
321. The stages of power, wealth and pleasure have their own special dangers. Each stage is subject to its own kind of social corruption. Social corruption resulting from an immoderate desire of power consists in a state of violence and war, in the harshness proper to ways of living consequent upon war, and in continued acts of arrogance intended to subjugate free peoples — magna latrocinia, as St. Augustine calls them.
Social corruption resulting from an immoderate desire of wealth leads to servitude. Love of wealth belittles noble spirits; there is no depth to which a lover of money cannot sink. Besides bearing every hardship that promises some possibility of enrichment, peoples’ wealth also attracts the cupidity of rulers who see it as a reason for imposing higher taxes and other burdens. Rousseau, after noting how Alexander, in order to keep the Icthyophagi under his rule forced them to renounce fishing and live off the produce of the land, adds: `And the American savages, who wander about naked and live only on what they hunt, could never be conquered. How can you impose a yoke on people who need nothing?’(100) These comments are true, but they go further than I need. Agricultural wealth, if it assists the institution and government of a society, is more to be praised than blamed. A society that regulates natural freedom is not some kind of servitude, but part of the perfecting of humanity. We cannot deny, however, that freedom is lessened. This proves that if love of wealth is excessive, initially good diminution of freedom changes into the evil of servitude. Social corruption resulting from the abuse of pleasure necessarily leads to barbarity; the light of intelligence is extinguished when social corruption acquires predominance in populations.
322. War, servitude and barbarity are, therefore, characteristics and effects which follow the corruption of society through excessive desire of power, wealth and sensual pleasure. Three kinds of integrity correspond to the three kinds of corruption in peoples.
1. The sign of integrity relative to pleasure consists, as we said, in valuing a healthy, robust, general well-being of person rather than actual pleasure as a constant perfection in nature.
2. The sign of integrity relative to wealth consists in a greater esteem of one’s own freedom and independence than in devotion to wealth.
3. The sign of integrity relative to power consists more in love of justice, equity and beneficence towards all than in love of power and glory.
These signs and characteristics of integrity are found in all societies when we examine the most ancient, primitive stage of their foundation. Greece and Rome are our proof.
323. Not far from Heraclea there is a place called Agamo after a queen who, for love of hunting, preserved her virginity. The name is a reminder that the pleasure of the hunt, in which all the benefits of a healthy, agile, robust, forceful body are experienced, were preferred to softness of any kind. According to Sallustius, `at one time, Roman youth learned how to put up with war through sheer hard work; they learned combat in the field as soon as they were capable of bearing arms. And they found more pleasure in stout weapons and war-horses than in prostitutes and banquets.’(101) The kind of incorrupt nature we are speaking about is shown by the delight described by Appius when he wanted to encourage the Romans to continue the siege of Veii during the winter: `Effort and pleasure are of their nature very different, but are joined in a certain natural companionship.’(102) And because country life removes occasions of such corruption, it was said that `agriculture is a neighbour and almost a kinswoman of wisdom.’(103) This is the sign of incorruption relative to pleasure.
324. Poverty was held in honour for a long time amongst the Romans who boasted that their private patrimony was small and the common patrimony great. Examples of this are seen in Valerius Publicola and Menenius Agrippa. They saved the State by their virtue, but had to be buried out of public funds; at their death, they did not leave enough to cover their funerals. Cincinnatus is another example. He returned to the plough after being dictator and leading the army to save Rome from extreme danger. Another example is found in sentiments expressed by Fabricius who told Pyrrhus about the contempt for gold and the honourable poverty which in Rome went hand in hand with the most important offices of the magistrature. There are many other memorable actions and sayings which show how Romans at their first stage of society put their own freedom and defence, and then their own power, before the vain splendour of treasure.(104) At that time, even women, who easily fall prey to avarice and vanity, gave up their precious gold ornaments for love of country; the people, still sound and great lovers of freedom, would not allow themselves to be seduced by the Tribunes who offered to divide the land for them.(105) At this stage, the love of wealth had not yet blinded and corrupted the practical reason of the masses.
325. Both in Greece and Rome alike we find facts which prove how at that time equity, justice and magnanimity prevailed over the love of power. When Hercules and Theseus fought with thieves, they wanted to use only the arms the thieves themselves had. This shows a certain type of bravery seeking something nobler than mere dominion. When Alexander, to avoid appearing like a common thief, refused to attack his enemies at night, he showed that his desire to dominate was still tempered by some kind of feeling of equity and magnanimity. When the Athenians ruled the seas after the defeat of the Persians, they laid down the amount to be paid by Greece and Asia for the maintenance of the fleet guarding Greece.(106) The Heracleotes refused to pay. The Athenians sent Lamachus with ten ships to demand the sum in question. He left for Pontus in the summer, took the triremes up the river Caleca and devastated the Heracleotean territory. At this point the mountain snows melted, causing a surge of water that drove his boats on to the rocks where they broke up. He was unable to return by sea, and dared not march overland for fear of the savage inhabitants. The Heracleotes, instead of profiting by his misfortune, gave him provisions and an armed escort for his return with the army to Chalcedon through the territories of Thrace in Bithynia. There are several examples of such conduct in the great days of Greece.
The same can be said about Rome. During Rome’s finest periods, the Senate, before declaring war, spent more time discussing the justice of the war than its usefulness. As we can see, love of power was still moderated by a feeling for justice.(107) The Romans, after defeating the Etruscans in battle, treated their enemies with great humanity, looked after their wounded and gave them a zone at Rome itself between the Palatine and Capitoline hills. This was a fine example of humanity and beneficence in victory. Porsenna was greatly moved, and freely restored to the Romans the territories beyond the Tiber ceded to him in a peace treaty. This was another example of how love of virtue overcame and conquered love of power. Signs of the three kinds of integrity we are discussing can be found, therefore, in the history of the most famous civil societies.
326. The same is true about the three kinds of corruption which correspond to the three kinds of integrity. What we have said clearly indicates that the worst corruption is that which snuffs out social existence by placing all social understanding in sensual desires. As a result, sense remains the sole guide of the people. This kind of corruption is either first or last; it either precedes the existence of a society and thus prevents its formation, or it indicates social decrepancy and thus annihilates the society. In both cases, it shows itself equally incompatible with the existence of civil association [App., no. 7].
Corruption arising from the desire for power and glory can be present in a nation which nevertheless remains upright relative to wealth and ways of life; freedom and simplicity of life can still be found there. During this period, the nation is wounded, but gives no sign of its weakness. Indeed, it remains on its feet, grows, and provides examples of virtue. Rome continued in this state for some time after the defeat of Carthage (608 AUC), the moment from which we can begin to measure the corruption of the Roman republic. The source of the corruption is immoderate covetousness, unleashed by domination.
Corruption arising from the passion for wealth is itself prior to the corruption consisting in the downfall of the senses. As a result, a nation does not abandon itself to voluptuousness as soon as it begins to lust for riches. For some time, it remains rich, temperate and frugal. Usually this period is also noteworthy, provided wealth is a result of industry; it is, however, extremely brief if riches flow into the State as an effect of aggrandisement. This explains why the wealth of Rome, that is, the spoils taken from nations and the gold that Spain took from the New World, rapidly give way to luxury and immorality in those peoples. War and conquest, not honest work and constant industry, were the sources of this wealth.
Nor should we believe that a nation which becomes powerful must immediately be dazzled and seduced by its own power. Although the possession of unlimited power and enormous wealth is dangerous, it is the decent or immoral origin of these goods which corrupts the masses, not the actual presence of the power or the gold. If power is the natural effect of justice and virtue, and wealth is the reward of industry and wise economy, neither corrupts peoples. Usurped power and stolen wealth serve to corrupt without limit because they themselves are rooted in corruption.
327. It is impossible, therefore, to determine precisely the length of the four stages through which nations pass, or the time they need to be influenced by the corruption proper to each of the three final stages. In this respect, nations move at different speeds. One nation may take a very long time to pass from one stage or kind of corruption to another; a second nation may pass rapidly through all the stages and kinds of corruption. We can only say that humanity itself contains a cause constantly inclining it to abuse power, greatness and material enjoyment. This cause is humanity’s lack of an absolute good which fully contents the human spirit, a lack which makes human nature seek its necessary, total contentment in everything which presents itself under the appearance of good: greatness, power, material abundance or sensual delight. Seeking from these things what they are incapable of giving is the deepest cause of the corruption present in humanity’s abuse of them.
328. Besides this universal, permanent cause of corruption, there are also variable causes. The waywardness of innate instinct is found to various degrees in different races. This is the unnoticed, principal cause of differing fortunes amongst peoples. Human generations are marked with their own stamp from their origin, which is the secret, powerful means used by Providence in assigning to nations their destiny. Climatic conditions influence the temperament and native character of races, although not entirely. The modifications they produce are only accidental.
Two external causes serving to help and accelerate the movement of societies through their determined stages can also be indicated. They are: 1. external occasions, the result of complex circumstances, which allow societies to organise themselves more quickly, establish themselves strongly, and go on to attain domination and wealth; 2. a higher degree of activity inherent in certain races which generally speaking enables populations to act more swiftly and thus achieve more in less time than steadier, slower populations. Here we must note the law governing this phenomenon: `Increased effort by human beings to attain external good through their own initiative and effort means greater affection for this kind of good, and greater pressure and force on the part of human beings to accelerate their own movements.’
329. Finally, having seen that there is a certain contentment corresponding to the first stage, in which the proximate end of a society determined by the practical reason of the masses is the very existence of the society, we can ask if there are also kinds of contentment corresponding to the next three stages in which the proximate end consists first in power, then wealth, then pleasure. My answer is as follows.
330. At the second stage, in which the practical reason of the masses seeks power and glory for the country, we have to distinguish two periods. In the first, eagerness for domination and glory is still modest, limited and just; in the second, power and glory are sought without limit or regard for justice. This second period cannot provide contentment; its only outcome is disquieting, insatiable longings which tear the spirit apart and cease only when the nation’s forces disintegrate or evil love of wealth takes their place. On the other hand, given that the desire for power and glory in the first period is limited and subordinate to justice, some contentment of spirit can result from achieving desired power and glory through just, upright means. In this case, contentment is the natural fruit of beneficence and prudence, and of a value that can only be explained as a support for what is right and just.
331. At the third stage (wealth), we have to distinguish different sources of wealth, as we said. Wealth as the fruit of unjust conquests is fatal, especially if the stage of wealth follows upon that of already corrupt power. In this case, there is no intermediary moment when spirits find rest; they pass with great avidity from one excessive, tormented desire to another. If, however, wealth has been achieved by a nation as a result of legitimate power or hard work, this stage is subdivided into two periods. In the first, the practical reason of the masses tends to seek the nation’s material well-being, but moderately, uprightly and equitably. Such a desire can be contented and thus constitute a state of contentment for the spirit. However the nation easily slides into the second period, especially if its increase in wealth has been excessive and easily come by. In this period, cupidity erupts like a flood; it knows no limit, it never says, `Enough!’ At this final moment, the masses, although very wealthy, are extremely unhappy and totally without interior peace.
332. We have to say more or less the same about the final stage of luxury and pleasure as we did about the stage of wealth. If pleasure is the result of usurped power and unjust acquired riches, and follows corrupt periods of power and wealth, there is an inevitable increase of tormented disquiet in the nation. If, on the other hand, the desire for pleasure is preceded by a decent period of power and wealth, the stage of pleasure also offers two periods or moments. In one, the pleasures sought are moderate and righteous; in the other, which soon follows the first, naked sensuality reigns without check or shame. In this case, it eats at the roots of civil association.
333. These vicissitudes to which the masses are subject have their hidden explanation in the condition of the human heart. We soon find the reason for historical events if we consider what takes place secretly within individuals. Let me add a few comments on the sequence of conditions in which the mind and spirit find themselves in human individuals. This will throw greater light on what we have said about nations.
334. In the development and journey of the mind and the spirit, we notice that the individual finds certain occasional places to rest which, however, prove provisory and temporary; what was thought capable of contenting the spirit totally is now recognised as insufficient. Realising his mistake fairly soon, the individual rouses himself and continues along the way of thoughts and affections until he appears to have arrived at some other resting place. This, too, soon proves illusory and the journey continues. These halts along the road of thoughts and affections produce two results: they hold back and delay individuals in their advance towards perfect knowledge and virtue, and at the same time prevent them from plummeting immediately to the depths of vice. If we analyse this extraordinary fact of the human spirit, we find that it takes place as follows.
335. When the mind seeks the reason for some fact, it is content with the first apparently true explanation that it meets, and rests in it. If further reflection shows the first explanation to be insufficient or false, or itself in need of further explanation, the spirit loses its former tranquillity and immediately sets out to find another better, truer or deeper reason. The same thing happens with the second reason it finds, and the third, and so on until the last. The delays made by the human spirit for false, imperfect or non-ultimate reasons can apparently vary in duration and even last a lifetime if individuals are not stimulated by some accidental occurrence to reflect on the insufficiency of the reasons they have discovered. The intelligence’s pauses and contentment are naturally neither stable nor sure until the true, final explanation of the fact is attained.
336. We can, however, consider the mind as some kind of map for the journeys of the spirit, that is, for the principle governing human operations. What occurs in the mind also takes place in the spirit as it searches for happiness; it overflows with joyful hope of great things whenever some good presents itself, assuring itself that happiness lies here. Attracted, it loses itself in the search for enjoyment of the good in which it has placed such high hopes. It rests; it is content — but only until its repeated, satiated experience of the good develops into weariness and vexation. Finally, realising its mistake, the spirit concludes that the apparent good was not what it had sought and hoped for. New desires, new searches are undertaken, and the spirit moves on until it comes to some other good. The same thing occurs, and the spirit moves from one good to another with intermittent pauses — like a landslide which, momentarily halted by some obstacle, finally comes to rest on level ground. These pauses and the accompanying imperfect contentment of spirit, although accidental, can be long or short, as we said. This will depend on the opportunities for reflection and progress which we have already indicated in a general way.
Notes
(95) I have explained (AMS, 687–726) both the natural malfunction of instinct and the development by which it comes to prevail in human beings.
(96) The reader would need to recall what has been said in SC [cc. 7 & 8].
(97) Ibid.
(98) The masses, who find all their good in pleasure of one kind or another, are like true prodigal sons who dissipate and consume what their predecessors have accumulated. Consequently, nations which have succumbed to sensual living rapidly sink from riches to poverty as pleasure becomes more precious to the people than wealth. This is most obvious in the case of Rome when the occupation of that sovereign people was reduced to eating and enjoyment. Every public office, and even the empire itself, was sold to the most prodigal competitor. Sallustius marvelled at a certain type of contemporary who was unable to possess any patrimony himself and could not tolerate it in others (Cf. Fragm. ex De Civ. Dei, 2: 18).
(99) We have already divided this stage into two periods, that of the founders and that of the legislators. Cf. SC, c. 7.
(100) Discours à l'académie de Dijon, P. 1.
(101) De Bell. Catil.
(102) Tit. Liv., Dec. I, bk. 5, c. 2.
(103) Colum., De re rust., bk. 1. — `Country life teaches austerity, diligence and justice' (Cic., Orat. pro Roscio Amer., n. 71).
(104) When Fabricius told Pyrrhus that the Romans wished to command those who possessed riches, not the riches themselves, he expressed a sentiment in which love of power, rather than love of freedom, prevailed over love of wealth.
(105) Livy, speaking about the people's rejection in 266 AUC of the proposition made by the Tribune Rabuleius (to reimburse the poor with public money for what they had spent in the preceding famine when buying grain given by Gelon, king of Syracuse, to the Republic), says: `The people spurned this as little different from an actual reward given by a kingdom. They had such an INBORN SUSPICION OF `KINGDOM' that even if they were to abound in everything, they would in spirit spurn all its gifts.' This philosophical manner of speaking, `spurned in spirit' (in animis hominum respuebantur) should be noticed: it shows how the principles governing a people's political attitude reside in their disposition of spirit. — Even in 690 AUC, Cicero was able to dissuade the Roman people from accepting the distribution of land offered by the tribune Servilius Rullus in the agrarian law. He did this by reminding them of the harm to freedom threatened by that law.
(106) Olymp. 87, a. 2.
(107) `They went to war as a last resort, not light-heartedly. In their view, only just wars could be undertaken' (Varro, De Vita P. R., bk. 2). The Fetiales, armed heralds sent to declare war, witnessed to the justice due to the Roman people with many oaths and before Jove. This is another proof of the point I am making. — Although it is fashionable today to malign everything done by the Romans, I would prefer to avoid the company of backbiters, whatever the fashion.