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Society And its Purpose

Book 3 - Determining the End of Civil Societies

CHAPTER 8

How the error committed by the masses in determining the end of civil society depends for its degree of harm on the form of government

394. What we have said until now about the error committed by the masses in determining the undetermined end of civil society through the instincts of corrupt will is verified whatever the form of government. Nevertheless, we may usefully note that different forms of government can make the corruption of the masses harmful to the nation in varying degrees.

395. It is true that the ruin of the State cannot be avoided if government is in the hands of individuals (even individuals exempt from normal corruption) rather than in the hands of the masses (unless the individuals in command possess the extraordinary moral power suitable for redeeming the masses from their corruption). In these circumstances, the corrupt masses continually evade laws and force the government to certain irregular, excessive enactments which produce a painful, arbitrary and totally ephemeral condition. However, the masses, when excluded from power, at least do not have any direct influence in the downfall of the State. Their indirect role consists in passive, invincible resistance which blocks their understanding of the aims of wise government and prevents their co-operation with it for the sake of public well-being.

396. On the other hand, if corrupt masses are in power, as for example where democracy prevails, they clearly have a direct part in pushing the State to its final destruction. All their vices, ignorance and brutal instincts overflow into the laws and public enactments. This explains why, in democratic States which have reached the extreme limits of corruption, we see an immediate retrograde movement towards aristocracy and monarchy, prompted by the instinct of self-preservation. This prolongs their existence but does not save them.

397. It was this ruinous action of the governing masses, so harmful to the existence of society which, according to Sallustius, caused the precipitous downfall of mores in Rome. Roman power would indeed have fallen even more quickly and dissolutely if the Caesars had not immediately taken command. The bestial wickedness of several of these emperors did not lay as heavily upon the laws and decisions of the State as would the ignorance, confusion and insanity of the Roman populace if the masses had continued to act as legislators and controllers of public affairs. The corruption of all the people far exceeds that of a single individual or several individuals, however perverse they may be.

398. The influence of the people, according to the level of their intellectual and moral condition, as arbiters of public affairs can be seen more easily if we consider what is taking place at present amongst populations which cannot really be called corrupt, but are nevertheless affected by the prejudice, passion and degree of ignorance usually found amongst the multitudes. I am speaking of America, and would draw attention to the reflections of an author who has lived a long time in the United States and notes with rare impartiality the good and evil of that government.

In Europe many believe but do not say, or say without believing, that one of the great advantages of universal suffrage is the way in which men worthy of public confidence are called to direct public affairs. For my part, I have to say that what I have seen in America does not encourage me to think like this. When I arrived in the United States, I marvelled at the worthiness of those who were governed and the lack of worthiness amongst those who governed. It is a constant fact that at present noteworthy people are called so rarely to public office in the United States. We have to recognise that this has occurred to the extent that democracy has overstepped its ancient limits. Clearly there are far fewer statesmen in America now than half a century ago.

Whatever you do, it is impossible to raise the intellectual standard of the people above a certain level. It is as difficult to conceive a State in which all human beings are enlightened as it is to think of all the citizens as rich. These are two co-relative difficulties. — Long study and many different notions are required to form an exact idea of the character of even one person. — The people never have the time and means for this kind of labour. Furthermore, judgments always have to be made hastily, and on the basis of what is immediately clear. The result is that charlatans of all kinds possess the secret of pleasing the people while the people’s true friends make a disastrous showing.

399. This is how the degree of ignorance characteristic of the people produces its effect in their decisions when public power depends on the populace. The same may be said of the particular vices which in democracies play too great a part in the determinations of the people.

It is not that democracies always lack the capacity of choosing worthy persons; they lack the desire and the taste for such a choice. We must not deceive ourselves: democratic institutions develop an extraordinary feeling of envy in the human heart. This is not because such institutions offer everyone the opportunity of being on a par with others, but because these means continually fail in the hands of those who use them. Democratic institutions arouse and deceive the passion for equality which it can never satisfy. Complete equality slips daily from the hands of the people just when they seem to grasp it; its flight, as Pascal says, is everlasting. The people are agitated as they search for this extremely precious good which is near enough to be known, but too distant to be tasted. The possibility of success moves them, but its uncertainty irritates; the people become disturbed, then tired, then embittered. Whatever moves a step ahead of them seems an impediment to their desires; no superiority, however legitimate, is looked upon favourably. —

In the United States, the people do not hate the upper classes but bear them little goodwill, and are careful to exclude them from power. The people do not fear great minds, but find them unattractive. In general, anything established without the support of the people will win their favour only with difficulty.(155)

400. If these passions already develop in an incorrupt multitude such as that of America, and have an influence in such important matters as the choice of the legislature, the distillation of ignorance and perversity of a totally ruined people will in democratic government sink abysmally in public affairs. The different States themselves of the American Federation show a gradual worsening in the choice of public functionaries as the ignorance and moral ruin of their citizens increases.

As you go further south in the States, where the social bond is less old and strong, where instruction is less wide-spread and the principles of morality, religion and freedom mixed in a less fortunate way, everyone notices that great minds and virtue become increasingly rare among those who govern. Finally, when you reach the new States of the south-west, in which the social body is still made up of an agglomeration of adventurers and speculators, it is difficult to discover who has been entrusted with public power. You find yourself asking what possible force, independent of the legislature and politicians, enables the State to grow and society to prosper.(156)

401. These examples are sufficient to indicate how the vices and ignorance of people under democratic government bring society to its downfall, if they increase beyond a certain limit. If, however, it is not the people en masse who govern, but a few individuals, it is certain that the State will not perish so quickly, however bad the choice of these individuals. It is impossible for the ignorance and brutality of these men to harm the State as much as the ignorance and brutality of disreputable masses whose desires go unchecked.

402. Our example again need extend no further than America. In particular, we can limit ourselves to a single point, the choice of the legislature. A bizarre contrast has been noticed between the quality of persons sitting in the House of Representatives and in the Senate. The assembly of Representatives at Washington presents an altogether populist aspect: a few outstanding people, small town lawyers, traders and even illiterate people of the lowest class, make up the body. This is the result of popular choice. The Senate, on the other hand, is composed of the best-known names in America: eloquent lawyers, famous generals, able magistrates, and well-known statesmen. This is the choice made by the legislature of each State. Although the legislators of individual States, chosen by the people, may not perhaps be the best persons available, their election of Senators is much superior to the choice made by the entire mass of the people when they vote for their Representatives.

It is easy to foresee the time when the American republics will be forced to extend the use of the two grades in their electoral system if they do not want to suffer shipwreck on the hazards of democracy.(157)

403. In certain nations (China is one example) the mass of the people is corrupt. Nevertheless, these nations survive through the intellective aristocracy which presides over the government. Although China has neither a strong government nor one which has made progress along the path of progressive civilisation (which is proper only to Christian nations), its rulers are sustained in virtue of assiduous studies that preserve a certain grade of intelligence amongst the mandarins. This grade is sufficiently high to maintain the stationary existence of those societies — an existence which, however, will fall away of itself as soon as China encounters more civilised Christian nations [App., no. 10].

404. Finally, Christianity, by placing individuals as teachers and pastors at the head of the great religious society, indicated the form of a natural government. But it also requires those individuals to be beacons of holiness and wisdom, consecrated exclusively to the good of humanity under the totally divine influence and power which Christianity itself adds to their rites of consecration. Christianity insists that such leaders should exercise their magisterium in the most conscientious way; and to provide for the best possible choice of leaders, it gives them alone the right to elect their successors and send them forth perpetually in the name of God. It also furnishes the leaders’ disciples and flocks with enlightenment, teaching and standards of judgment that enable them to distinguish good and bad teaching and conduct in the individuals who govern them. The same gifts enable the disciples to discern true from false teachers, and the voice of the shepherds from that of mercenaries and wolves. In doing all this, Christianity has solved the great problem: `What are the best possible guarantees against abuse by individuals who govern?’ Christianity shows that these guarantees all lie in the good conscience of rulers, and in the moral enlightenment and conscience of those who are governed. Political theory has no consistency outside these Christian guarantees. All constitutions and all forms of government, whatever the effort which brings them about, have a weak side, a kind of immense breech through which pours the most outrageous, vicious violence, despotism and murderous desires.

405. In conclusion it is clear that human societies, when abandoned to themselves without any extraordinary, powerful leader to brake and redirect them, move on gradually, but fatally and ineluctably, to irreparable ruin. We may indeed ask if such a powerful leader and saviour of human societies really exists. Is there some extraordinary person whose sagacity enables him to rise above his fellow-citizens and the entire society whose child he is? — We formulate our answer by examining the power of individuals’ speculative reason over the masses, and by seeing whether this reason has sufficient power to hold back the masses in their course. In other words, can this speculative reason redirect the masses so that they govern their social wills and their actions with the political criterion we have indicated, that is, a criterion which requires that society should always look to the contentment of its members and to acquiring nothing more than those special benefits helpful to producing contentment?

Notes

(155) De la Démocratie en Amérique, t. 2, c. 5.

(156) Ibid.

(157) Ibid.

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