Society And its Purpose
Book 3 - Determining the End of Civil Societies
CHAPTER 16
Morality restored to the world together with intelligence
473. Non-Christian humanity, which tends to the acquisition of temporal good, could not make a social object of systematic knowledge considered in itself. It was able to esteem cognitions only to the extent that they could serve the attainment of the proximate end of its societies. Christianity, however, raised systematic knowledge to another plane by making it an object sought and desired per se by human beings(206) and by giving humanity as its end an object which is essential light for our minds, `enlightening every man that comes into the world.’(207) Granted that Christianity has persuaded mankind that cognition contains something divine and absolute in itself, we cannot wonder if Christianity also renews and brings to light from its fruitful womb every branch of knowledge. However, Christianity did more than place systematic knowledge above all temporal good; it also introduced virtue into the world. In the societies of antiquity, virtue had entered in a thoroughly limited and imperfect way.
474. Virtue presupposes the knowledge of true good(208) because it consists in great part in desiring and obtaining the good of our fellows as far as we can. The morals prevalent in antiquity only succeeded in positing the principle of virtue in sociality, as Cicero did.(209) This principle, however, had different meanings for different social stages. As we said, love of country changed its object as the mind changed the notion of good which it thought desirable for the country. Nevertheless, as long as an individual desired power, glory and wealth for society, that is, for his country, some sort of good, however insufficient, was indeed desired.
But when human beings saw good only in voluptuousness, nothing remained to be desired for one’s country, a moral body which vanished before the eyes of voluptuous people who sought not a body formed by abstraction, but a physical body. Virtue, therefore, was extinguished along with society — I mean the limited, imperfect virtue which matched the imperfect good that was its object and scarcely merited the holy name of virtue.(210) Stoic teaching, in showing the vanity of every external good and reducing virtue to a sterile effort because it lacked an object, contributed to the destruction of morality amongst the nations (a destruction which had already originated in mankind’s loss of faith in good which could be desired for others). The Epicureans, supremely selfish, remained the sole victors in the field.
475. The Gospel arrived. It was able to indicate to mankind a good which could be trusted, and an absolute good at that. From then on, human affection, which had died through lack of nourishment,(211) revived in all hearts. Human beings knew from that moment what to desire for themselves, and what to desire for others. They knew that beneficence was possible. Virtue, therefore, could now take its proper place because, as I said, it is reduced to a desire for others’ good. This also explains why the new virtue introduced into the world by Christianity took the name of charity with total propriety. From now on, virtue took root and was complete. Virtue, absolute goodness, existed in the world because there was an absolute good to desire. Before, there had only been what we may call a shadow of virtue, which passed and vanished like the opinion of the empty, illusory good that formed its object.
This explains why virtue could not enter the societies of paganism as an element of their end, but only as a social means. In humanity redeemed by Christ, true, complete virtue takes the place it merits. It would be a sacrilegious profanation if Christians were to consider virtue other than as an end desirable in itself. Sublime and noble as it is, Christian virtue rejects every lower place. Society as a whole must bow before it, obey it, and draw its own nobility and duration from this obedience.
Notes
(206) Even today there are some who maintain that knowledge has no value of itself, but only in relationship to the temporal benefits it produces. These people arbitrarily divide cognition into two parts, the first of which, according to them, contains useful knowledge, the second useless knowledge. Romagnosi was no stranger to such a debased prejudice. Such writers are truly anti-Christian and, without realising it, mortal enemies of modern civilisation.
(207) Jn 1: [9] Douai.
(208) Cf. Storia comparativa e critica de' sistemi morali, c. 8, §7. In describing the disputes between the Stoics and other philosophers, I showed that there can be no absolute virtue without an absolute good to which virtue tends.
(209) From Grotius onwards, it has been common to attribute to Cicero the system that places the supreme principle of morality in sociality. We should reflect, however, that properly speaking the great orator did not reach the level required to propose the problem of the supreme principle of morality. It is true that places can be found in which he seems to refer all human virtue to the love of country and of human sociality. He had too much good sense, however, to abandon himself systematically to the consequences of such an imperfect principle. As a result, he abandons it in some places, and especially where he notices that there are intrinsically evil things which cannot be done even to save one's country. He says expressly: `There are certain things which are so disgusting, and in part so flagrant, that a wise man will avoid them even if they could save his country' (Cf. the entire passage in De Off. 1: 55).
(210) This explains why St. Augustine denied the existence of true virtue where there is no knowledge of the true God in which it must terminate. He says: `Amongst all truly pious people, there can be no one without true piety, that is, without true worship of God, who is capable of true virtue. It is not true virtue when its purpose is human glory' (De C D, 1: 19).
(211) St. Paul characterises the Gentiles as people `without affection'.