Society And its Purpose
Book 3 - Determining the End of Civil Societies
HOW THE PROXIMATE,
BUT THEORETICALLY UNDETERMINED
END OF CIVIL SOCIETY
BECOMES FACTUALLY DETERMINED
INTRODUCTION
283. We have shown at length in the previous book that the ultimate and primary end of civil society is the moral contentment of the human spirit. This end is simple, obvious and fully determined in itself. But civil association, besides possessing this ultimate end (or social end, as we may call it) has its own proper end, that is, its proximate end (or civil end, as we have called it). Relative to the social end, the civil end must be considered as a simple means, and valued as such, neither more nor less. It is not easy to describe adequately the nature of this proximate end of civil society.
284. Although some elements of the proximate end of civil society can undoubtedly be indicated easily, because they are essential to all civil societies, this is not true of all elements. For instance, the following is one of the fairly obvious elements composing the proximate end of civil society: `The protection of all rights pertaining to individual members by means of the least violent and most peaceful defence of these rights.’ I do not wish to comment on this formula, which expresses the first element of the civil end — I am not writing a treatise on right — but the thoughtful reader will understand its importance without difficulty and sense its intimate truth.
Granted this formula and the full protection of the rights of all individuals, it is clear that each individual can make free use of his rights within their limits and in the correct way. Practically speaking, civil freedom consists in this free use of all one’s rights. This brings to light another element of the proximate end of civil society: `The maintenance of the greatest possible civil liberty of all the individuals composing the society.’ These two elements, 1. the peaceful, effective defence of rights and 2. the fullest possible freedom in exercising them, can never be absent from the end for which people form civil associations, and are therefore necessarily included in the end of such associations. We are now faced, however, with another question: what is to prevent members from drawing other kinds of good from their association?
285. It is certain that association can be a means, willed by the members, towards many different kinds of good. Likewise, the administration responsible for some aim intended by the social will can be limited to some degree by this will in the use of the means available for obtaining its purpose, and in the arrangements it can make relative to the purpose. In certain States, for example, many useful works are carried out by means of private societies; in other States, by the government. The functions of administration and of government are not equally determined and defined in all places. For this reason we said that civil society is one of those societies which, considered in general, have an undetermined, proximate end.(86)
286. This means, of itself undetermined, has to be determined in every individual civil society by two principles, Right and Fact, which determine the proximate end of civil society.
287. The science of Right, which can determine the end of civil society, is still in its infancy. Practically nothing has been done about it in those places where civilisation seems most advanced. All European nations with the exception of Switzerland and the municipality of San Marino have a mixed constitution composed of a seigniorial and a social element variously proportioned in different States. These proportions change through violent or peaceful political revolutions, instantaneously or gradually, and principally because the two elements are not sufficiently determined by some express, evident Right [App., no. 5].
Right which has to determine the seigniorial element is universal and particular. Universal Right contains the principles needed to provide the determination of which we are speaking. Particular Right applies these principles to the de facto titles found in different nations. Through this application, it is able to establish whether this seigniorial element exists in a given nation and, if so, its precise sphere.
288. The general theory of these titles, and the principles of justice and equity to be applied to them, are not yet complete. Even less care has been taken to collate the real titles themselves and the documents indicating facts which, in individual nations, can provide a base for seigniorial right and limit its extension. This work viewed with apprehension by those who could undertake it; they reasoned like aristocracies which, as we said, are loathe to provide clear laws. This reason is not, we maintain, a simple will to abuse power through vague, undetermined laws, but rather fear of the dangers foreseen as an inevitable result of the discussions that must precede every attempt to establish new, clear laws.(87)
289. The social element can be based only on the nature of the society, the will of its members and on all the documents enabling us to know this will precisely.
290. Such de jure determination of the proximate end of society is reserved for the future. It will not be delayed by any human will, and it is the greatest step that civilisation is about to take. It is true that all right pertains to the ideal order, but whether progress comes about in this order or not, or whether the proximate end of society is determined or not by human thought and expressed under positive sanctions, the agent causes, which pertain to the real order, continue to act for good or evil, justly or unjustly, in society. The proximate end of society therefore is always under de facto determination, despite its continued de jure indetermination. Our intention in this book is to study this single, unremitting de facto determination of the civil end.
Notes
(86) By associating, members tend proximately to a varying degree of complex good which can be made up in various ways. To achieve this end, government can use only those means least onerous for its members. In other words, it must obtain the end proposed for it with the least possible evil. Consequently, it must have at its disposition only what is strictly necessary to achieve its end. This must always be understood, however, relative to its capacity for solving more or less adequately this problem of the least means.
(87) If we consider the highest aristocracy of Europe before the French revolution, we do not find a single sovereign State without its precious claims over other States. There was no desire to define and bring to term such half-rights because each State wished to reserve for itself some excuse for action when occasion offered. This is the worst kind of false political theory. Uncertainty about rights and the secret struggle over unending claims must cause constant distrust amongst States and generate war with extreme ease. Some idea of the mutual claims held by European courts can be seen by reading the booklet Intérêts et maximes des princes et des états souverains, Cologne, 1666. — This part of seigniorial-public right has made great progress since the French revolution. Many ancient claims have been mutually renounced; conventions between reigning houses have been clarified, defined more closely and made more explicit. There is no doubt that similar progress is required today in the field of social-public right.