Society And its Purpose
Book 4 - Psychological Laws and the End of Civil Societies
CHAPTER 10
Continuation
594. Let us examine the second way of calculating the total good present in a society.
We know that in the 18th century political theorists mistakenly measured the prosperity and well-being of a country solely and indistinctly by its population. Later this error was corrected, or so it was thought, by the assertion that `the total good contained in civil society must be determined by the number of prosperous people', not by the population in general. But this, in my opinion, is still insufficient. Certainly, the number of prosperous people must be taken into account when calculating the total good possessed by the members of a society, but it cannot be either the sole or principal element in the calculation.
595. To determine the quantity of good possessed by all it is not enough to know that there is a certain number of prosperous inhabitants in a given country. We must also know the quantity of good enjoyed by each if we are to unite the particular quantities and determine the total quantity. Furthermore, the calculation must take account of all the kinds of real good I have distinguished above as influencing on our human contentment. Certainly we must not limit ourselves to calculating only material good, or over value it in circumstances related with contentment. If we are to call material things good, they have to produce contentment in us. Clearly, if different kinds of real good can accumulate indefinitely in an individual, and if we neglect to calculate all the good possessed by each individual, our total can be grossly erroneous.
596. What we have said about good must also be applied to evil. To determine the quantity of good in the individuals composing a given society, we must total all the evil and subtract its sum from the sum of all the good we have already calculated; what remains will be the quantity of net good found in the society in question. We have seen that, because of the unity of the human spirit and its contentment, evil can in reality be truly balanced and compensated by good.(281)
To determine accurately the sum of evil existing in the members of a given society therefore it is not sufficient to know how many individuals suffer; we must know the quantity of evil in each. Evils, too, accumulate indefinitely, and a single individual can suffer more than all others, or suffer an evil which is not compensated even by the good enjoyed by all others.
597. These reflections show the falsity of judging the comparative happiness of different peoples by comparing the proportional number of contented individuals and subtracting this from the proportional number of suffering individuals.
598. This kind of calculation of public happiness is supported particularly by Bentham and is common today among radicals of all nations. It has an air of benevolence and humanity about it because it seems to show concern for the well-being of the majority. But if we carefully and coherently examine the consequences of its principles, we find (and it should come as no surprise) that this way of calculating public prosperity leads to inhumanity and tyranny; individuals and minorities are sacrificed to the well-being of majorities. I demonstrate this as follows.
599. If the principles I have posited concerning the accumulation of good and evil in different individuals are undeniable, and if it is certain and clear that an individual of the human species can differ infinitely from another individual of the same species in respect of the quantity of good and evil he possesses, then it is equally certain that the consequences of the theory I oppose must often be barbarous and tyrannical.
600. Let us grant that certain forms and modes of governing a country could be more effective than others in obtaining a majority of prosperous, contented citizens, while the remaining citizens are plunged into the deepest misery and unhappiness. On the other hand, we may find that with other forms and ways of administering the country the number of prosperous, contented citizens would be smaller, but none of the other citizens is oppressed by the horrible squalor of misery imposed on them by the first kind of government. If the theory I am challenging is to be coherent with itself, it must choose the first kind of administration.
This theory favours only a majority of contented citizens and a minority of unhappy citizens. It must therefore justify this form of government in the face of all the inexpressible calamities to which it subjugates a certain number of individuals and by which it obtains the well-being of the greatest possible number of individuals. The few are sacrificed to the many, the comfortable life of some costs the tears and blood of others, and freedom is found in one part of society, while pitiless oppression and servitude reigns in the other. I believe, however, that each member of society is to be treated with respect; not a single member can be sacrificed to the good of all the others if his sufferings, balanced against the enjoyment of all, resulted in a quantity of either greater evil or lesser good than that obtainable by other governmental means.(282)
601. In a word, it is humanity itself that must be the concern of a wise, beneficent government, whether humanity is present in few or many individuals. If humanity suffers more in a single individual than it would in many, it is far better that the sufferings be shared by the many provided, as I said, that the total of shared suffering is not equal to that of the single individual. This is obviously true. For the same reason, a similar argument must be true in the case of good.
If the object of our benevolence is humanity (in which properly speaking philanthropy consists) and we wish to do as much as we can for its good, whether humanity subsists in many or few individuals, we may have to choose the enjoyment of the few, or even of a single person, rather than of the many. When good is present in this way, human nature would have more enjoyment, and share in a greater quantity of good than it would if the enjoyment and good, instead of being accumulated, were divided and shared among many.
602. This is the great principle which justifies Providence in the government of the world. Providence, in permitting certain evils and in accumulating good in determined individuals, follows the following principle: `The permanently intended purpose of the Creator in the government of humanity is the maximum net good obtainable from evil.' This is the supreme idea, the archetype of all government.
603. Nevertheless, the ease with which we understand the truth of this teaching applied to evil is offset by the difficulty we have in convincing ourselves about the same teaching applied to good. Accumulating good in a few people and leaving many others without seems to be contrary to both equity and humanity. But this way of reasoning concerns only one part of the theory, and is therefore incomplete and false. We must distinguish between that which relates to justice and that which relates to humanity. We will speak first about what is required of us by the virtue of humanity, and then discuss the same thing relative to justice and equity.
604. To know what is more in conformity with the virtue of humanity, we must carefully reflect that the arguments for establishing the quantity of evil are as valid as those for demonstrating the quantity of good.
Note that I am not excluding the number of persons whose evil is reduced or good increased. Undoubtedly, the greater the number of happy people we can form, the greater the total good, provided the degree of happiness is the same in each and the means used for producing the good does not increase the evil of others. I am simply saying that all effort must be directed to obtaining the maximum net good.
Moreover, if it is possible to succeed in distributing this maximum among many rather than a few individuals, such action does not contradict humanity and conforms to equity. Indeed, it would be highly desirable if this maximum quantity of net good could be divided in equal proportions among all human beings. Humanity, it is true, would gain nothing, but the distribution would be more equable. If, on the other hand, the distribution were not possible without diminishing the maximum quantity of net good enjoyed by humanity, supporting the distribution would mean that human nature had lost a part of its good, and this would clearly be an offence against the virtue of humanity. Hence, we see that whatever applies to evil must also apply to good.
605. The two extreme cases which are presented by this theory and seem contradictory (if considered superficially) are:
1. Granted that the maximum net good in a social body can be obtained on the sole condition that it is accumulated in a single individual, so that only evil remains for the rest, such a state must be considered satisfying, according to the principles of the virtue of humanity.
2. If the maximum net good can be obtained on the sole condition that all the evil is accumulated in a single individual, while all the others enjoy the good in varying degree, this state must also be considered satisfying, according to the same principles of humanity.
Between these two extremes, in one of which a single individual is content and in the other a single individual suffers, there are countless intermediary cases, which form two series. The first series contains those cases where all possible minorities are happy and content; the second, the cases where the minorities are unhappy and discontent. According to the principle of humanity, all the cases constitute totally satisfying social states if it remains true in each that `the maximum total of net good has been obtained.' By `net good' I mean the good from which has been subtracted the sum total of evil in the individuals composing the society.
606. What prevents popular reason from seeing clearly the certitude of such principles is its inability to understand that the means suitable for producing public good and available to government are so limited in their efficacy that the maximum good cannot be procured without the harsh limitations mentioned above. The populace together with the authors of popular teachings believe that any quantity of good can be obtained with the means available to government in such a way that all without exception have more than enough.
On the other hand, those with experience, and anybody who has reflected deeply on the limits inherent in human good and in the means for producing it, are fully persuaded that no government or constitution exists, or can exist, capable of producing limitless good and of destroying all evil. They conclude that the wisdom of any government whatsoever must solve, before it acts, the problem I proposed about the quantity of net public good free of all evil. The only way this can reasonably be done by government, according to the principles of humanity which must guide government, is the way I have posited. As a result, wise government `must first of all formulate directives for producing the maximum net good, and secondly, for distributing this good among the greatest number possible of individuals.'
607. Let us now examine the theory relative to equity. Equity seems to reject it by requiring that all human beings not only have their portion of good but also share in their portion of inevitable evil. This kind of reflection could prevent some people from accepting the teaching given above. An apparent difficulty however should never deter us so easily; we should examine the difficulty and weigh its solidity. In this case, it will simply disappear.
608. First of all, what we have said must be clearly understood. We supposed the presence of a constant quantity of good and of evil or, if we unite the evil and good, a constant quantity of net good which we could either distribute as we liked among many members of a society or accumulate in a few. We decided we would without doubt distribute the good equally to each member of the society. The problem changes however if the quantity of net good is not constant, that is, if it completely or partly evades us when we want to distribute it equally. I affirm that in this particular case the greatest possible quantity of good is to be preserved by accumulating it, rather than by dividing it and thus losing a part which human nature could have enjoyed. In this unique case, I say, equity must give place to humanity.
609. Secondly, we need to discuss the so-called principle of equity which states that `each person must have his equal portion of net good.' If we consider this principle universally and abstractly, we immediately see how specious it is. In fact, it begins by considering human nature abstractly in individual human beings. Considered in this way, human nature is equal in everybody and is what I have called pure, simple existence. And if pure, simple existence is the only thing we consider in human beings, there is no reason in the world why one should be preferred to another; giving one human being advantage over others seems arbitrary, prejudiced and contrary to reason. Ceaseless abstractions such as these led philosophers and political theorists into harmful errors. Anything abstract is only part of the real thing.
Reasoning about an abstract part is not, therefore, reasoning about the thing itself. Thus accurate reasonings about an abstract part are extremely erroneous relative to the thing itself. In our case we want to know what pertains to each human being. If we start by considering the pure, simple existence common to all individuals, not only a part but the most important part of the individual is neglected. This is clear from what we have demonstrated, namely, that the good acquired by our good habits can have a value infinitely greater than the good of existence we receive from nature.
Hence, if human beings are considered as they are in reality, rather than abstractly, the principle proposed above (`equity requires good to be divided into equal portions among all the individuals composing a given society') is seen to be entirely arbitrary and false. In fact, the contrary principle is clear: `Equity and distributive justice prohibit the division of the net good into equal portions among all associated individuals; rather, it requires different degrees of accumulation in some definite individuals.'
610. When justice demands that the wicked be punished and the virtuous rewarded, it is simply prescribing that other evils (eudaimonological) accumulate in those in whom moral evils exist, and that more good (also eudaimonological) accumulate in those in whom moral good exists. Thus, according to justice, evil sometimes entails another evil, and good, another good. The gospel makes the same solemn judgment where we read: `To him who has will more be given, and from him who has not, even what he thinks that he has will be taken away.(283)
611. Furthermore, eudaimonological good, which is sometimes simply a result of virtue or a reward of merit, produces of its nature other good, so that it multiplies of itself in the hands, so to speak, of individuals, provided government does not obstruct it. A materially radical or egalitarian government which saw this kind of good accumulating in the hands of some individuals and thought it had the right or even the obligation to seize and distribute it to all the citizens in equal portions, would be like a crazy tyrant claiming that everybody must be of the same height. Applying his so-called law of equity, he shortens all those taller than the established height and stretches the limbs of those below it.
612. We must also note that, relative to equity, justice and right, all the ideas introduced by modern political authors who have been raised on sensist philosophy are completely false. These writers claim that human rights are rooted totally in the human tendency to pleasure. Beginning with this principle, they argue more or less as follows: `All human beings have an equal tendency to pleasure. Therefore all have an equal right to good. But every time a human being possesses a greater amount of good than another, he has usurped what belongs to his equals. Therefore, a government must not allow good to be accumulated in any single individual but strive to distribute it evenly so that no one ever has more than another.' We see here the clear foundation of the radical and egalitarian teachings under discussion. No person of good sense can fail to recognise that they are a collection of absurdities.
613. On the other hand, if the hypothesis were true that the tendency to pleasure is the sole source of human rights, these teachings would have to be accepted as coherent and simple. But the tendency to pleasure is not the foundation of any right. If it were, even irrational beings would have rights: a lion, with its very strong tendency for the taste of human blood, would be exercising a true right when dismembering a human being. Right exists solely on condition that the duty to respect another's tendency to good exists. Moral duty, which imposes respect for another's tendency to good and converts it into right, cannot originate in the same tendency; on the contrary, it limits our tendency by obliging us to respect the tendency of others.(284)
614. But if the concept of right is founded on the duty to respect the tendency of others to eudaimonological good and to limit our own, it is clear that, before following our own tendency to this good, we must concern ourselves with duty, which controls the tendencies to good that we all have. Granted this (and it cannot be denied), we have introduced a rule superior to the supposed right of material equality - we have introduced morality, and with its introduction the whole egalitarian system collapses. From the moment that we admit the existence of any moral obligation whatsoever, we necessarily admit moral inequality in society.
This inevitably alters the whole superficial system of equality. We cannot rank the person who faithfully fulfils his obligations with the person who does not; we cannot class together the person who respects the tendencies to good of others and the person who does not. We must recognise that the latter, author of his own moral evil, submits of himself to the force used by others to check and limit his perverse intentions; others can, if necessary, take away his freedom in order to defend themselves, or frighten him with the threat of punishment. In a word, they can reduce him to a condition lower than that of all other human beings, stripping him of much eudaimonological good and inflicting injury.
Hence the right to share in an equal portion of eudaimonological good either does not exist or must not be understood materially - as it is understood by those who reduce every human right to it alone. They declare it inalienable, imperscriptible and unalterable, precisely because, according to them, it is not subordinate to or limited and regulated by any other right.
615. Another absurd consequence of the theory would be that nobody could renounce his portion of good if the tendency to pleasure constituted the sole title of rights. If the only existing right were that of satisfying one's own tendency to pleasure, clearly anyone who renounced this unique right would at the very least be mad.
616. If however it were claimed that the source of the tendency to pleasure was, together with the right, also the source of duty - and this is what is claimed - a person who either entirely or partly renounced this tendency would be blameworthy relative to the first, universal duty. Such a superficial system destroys every generous act of beneficence by which we put others before ourselves; it destroys all impartial affection by which we sacrifice ourselves to the good of others. To extinguish generous feelings in the human heart and banish magnanimous works from the world is not only stupid but clearly harmful to human nature.
We should therefore discard the system of the sensists and hedonists and continue to allow virtuous souls to do good to others even at the cost of their own good. Virtue and love should be permitted to produce social inequalities of good and evil among us. Some would have us believe that all inequality is repugnant or unjust, but only those who are unjust and lack love would see it this way. We can conclude therefore that the doctrine of the equality of good, understood in its material sense, is false and reprehensible. Equally false is the teaching that governmental wisdom must tend to this equality as to its end.
617. Finally, if any government were to direct its efforts to this end (as some claim a government should), it would have the duty of actually suppressing and suffocating every natural seed of good to prevent some from developing faster than others; the fastest would have to wait for the slowest. We need to be convinced that good is produced only through the development of seeds sown in us and in the world by the Author of things. In the world of plants, there are different seeds which develop and fructify at different times, in different ways and with varying strength: one shoot blossoms with the first rays of spring while another is hardly stirring under the May sun; one develops vigorously with great promise, another unfurls languidly and listlessly.
Similarly, the hidden seeds of good develop with varying virtue and efficacy in the powers and innate constitution of each human being, subject in different ways to circumstances. A farmer who tried to prevent the most beautiful plants from producing more fruit than the poorest plants would be considered mad. In the same way, we must consider crazy and mad, if not depraved, a ruler who has resolved to limit, penalise and suppress those fertile seeds of good which, in the minds, affections and life of some individuals, develop better than in others, and takes this action so that the good produced more abundantly by the seeds in some does not accumulate in any one individual.
Although this insane enemy of all progress might have the power to ruin the best fruit and damage the most robust seeds, he would be powerless to invigorate and strengthen the weakest seeds. Moreover, because he could not foresee which seeds would be guilty of developing better than others, he would have to maintain an alert police force ready to cut away the foliage of the plants that dared to produce more luxuriant growth and prettier flowers. Thus, the liberal, radical theory we are combating reaches extremes contrary to nature and repugnant to both common sense and reason, extremes as cruel as they are destructive.
618. We have already noted that authors of the theory are content to consider everything abstractly. This prevents their seeing the monstrous, absurd consequences that render their doctrine more deserving of ridicule than serious confutation. In fact the doctrine once more ends up as meaningless, if we consider the nature of the means necessary to achieve public prosperity by a government that follows this teaching. If it were true that an equal portion of good was due by right to everyone so that anyone having a larger portion would possess it unjustly, a government's supreme and only duty would be to take any excess good and continually bestow it where there were less. In doing this, the government would only be exercising justice, and all its governmental actions and means would be strictly just.
Furthermore, every kind of means whatsoever in the hands of a government would be upright and just, provided that the government could use the means to obtain such constant equality, and that equality were the only social right and duty. In this system the goodness of the end would sanctify the iniquity of the means. It is not difficult to see that a government which followed these principles would not only be acting in opposition to all the ideas the world has so far formed about what is just and upright, but would be far more intolerable than any government has ever been or can be. The most culpable thing in the order of morality and most inhuman in the order of eudaimonology lies entirely in the maxim, so popular these days: `The end sanctifies the means.'
619. But let us leave aside such a tragic, infamous consequence, the inevitable result of the political theory of the equality of every good. We must deal with the other consequence we have mentioned, that is, `a government should use only actions and means that are strictly just, not merely beneficent and prudent.' Let us grant that some actions, called beneficent today, were to continue in existence but always bearing the characteristic of actions of strict justice.(285) To confuse what pertains to beneficence with what pertains to justice, to impose on the obligation of beneficence the rigorous and harshness of what is due, to equate the precept to do good with the precept forbidding theft: all this is to abolish the division between two virtues always considered distinct. Such action necessarily leads society to destruction unless it turns back at the sight of the terrible consequences.
To understand this, it is sufficient to consider that perfect right necessarily includes the use of force. Anyone who has perfect right can, whenever defence requires it, violently repel the person inflicting violence. Thus, if the right of each individual to the same portion of good is perfect and absolute, the result is obvious: every time a government fails to equalise all the good, all those with a smaller quantity of good can violently force the government to effect the equality. This can only occasion an open, ceaseless war between the majority of the associated members and the government because those who have less good are always the majority.
620. Another consequence is that anyone with less good to whom the government does not dispense this kind of justice can use force to despoil other members of the society, taking as much as is necessary to make the portions just. This explains the constant open warfare between individuals.
621. The third consequence. We have seen that anyone with a smaller portion of good would have a reason (the previous consequence) for forcefully obtaining what is his from both government and individual members. But anyone who in good faith believed that his portion of good was less than that of others would also have the same reason. If equality of good is the only right and only duty, then each person is necessarily judge in his cause. Because no one recognises any natural right in others, not even the right to judge, he cannot recognise others as judges. This also contributes to disastrous, universal war.
622. The fourth consequence. If these judgments were unjust, force would again be our only choice, and indeed judgments of this kind made by wicked people in their own cause would be unjust. Thus all good would be appropriated by the strongest among the wicked who also made the law. In this case, the only kingdom on earth would be one of brute force, a force resting almost inevitably in the hands of the most bold, determined wicked people, who would be the majority. If there happened to be someone who did not abuse the right he had, or honestly believed himself obliged to respect others, and wished to do so, he would see his own right attacked from all sides; the so-called foundation of equality would be overthrown by violent people. Thus, with all reciprocity removed, he would think that this false right and every true right had been annihilated, and everybody freed from their obligation of not violating the ownership of others.
Clearly, all these teachings are anarchical.
623. What we need to do is reform the principles leading to such disastrous consequences. We need to re-establish the distinction between perfect and imperfect rights, between the duty to help humanity and the duty of respect for each other's ownership. Moreover we must admit that the tendency to pleasure and good is not sufficient to give human beings a right to the pleasure and good to which they tend. Consequently no equality understood in this material way pertains to human rights; equality of this kind would in fact be reduced to an interminable succession of injustices, violations and enormous inequalities.
624. After destroying the delusion of these chimerical theories, we must consider how to classify the actions and means used by government to obtain the maximum, total good in the civil society it is administering. It is clear that government can injure the rights of the members as much as an individual can, and that the most elementary duty of government is respect for the ownership and perfect rights of the people. Indeed it must not only respect, but defend these rights. If it did not do so, it would not increase the amount of good, but be the author both of the moral evil it would commit and of the eudaimonological evil of those whose rights it would violate.
Government fulfils this first duty by means of a positive, entirely wise legislation which determines the rights of each citizen with strict justice and clarity, and guarantees those rights. This duty also requires tribunals to apply the law to particular cases without any hint of arbitrary judgment. The first class of governmental activity and means is that which concerns justice. It is with these means that government preserves to each his own. This class of actions and means however is more concerned with government's duty to avoid or prevent evil rather than to do good. Our question, `How must government exercise its influence in the production and increase of good as a whole?', presupposes government's faithful fulfilment of this first duty, and deals with later acts and means.
625. Granted therefore that the rights of all members are respected and safeguarded, we ask again: `What more must government do to promote the good of its subjects?'
Governmental acts and means in pursuit of this aim form part of the prudence and exercise of humanity which government must practise towards the members. Thus, relative to this second class of prudent actions and means, we must ask: `For government to be called truly human must its duty direct its enactments to the acquisition of the greatest possible amount of net good in the society, or sacrifice a part of this good which humanity would enjoy so that the remaining good can be distributed among the members with greater equality?'
In my opinion, every government desirous of exercising to the highest degree its duty of humanity must first ensure that the smallest part of attainable good is not wasted, even if the good has to be accumulated in certain individuals to obtain this aim. Non-existent good is the property of no one. Government therefore does not injure anyone's right if, with prudent means, it applies itself to the greatest possible increase of good. Government that does this is not partial to certain individuals at the cost of others. On the contrary, this policy is the only way to treat everybody with perfect equality, and without greater affection for one individual than another.
If government arbitrarily preferred some individuals to others, it could be seen as sinning against distributive justice. But if it depends solely on external circumstances, on the nature of things, and often on the varying merit of individuals themselves, it cannot be said to act with injustice and favouritism simply because some individuals are so placed in society that they inevitably share more widely in the good which the government, without respect or favouritism for any individual, is promoting with all its force.
If government follows the rule of the greatest good, which we have indicated, and rejects the absurd principle that each person must have a perfect right to an equal portion of non-existent good (the discussion is about the most suitable means for making that good exist), it truly acknowledges in everyone an equal right to compete for the good. Certainly, the government does not admit any members' right in rem, as it were, but it does admit an equal right ad rem, provided the circumstances are always the same.
626. When government acts in this way, equity and wisdom shine forth in every part of its conduct. Any government whose legislation favours the greatest production of net good becomes a government of real progress, the disciple of nature and minister of Providence. Such a government will strive to nurture every seed of good wherever it lies and germinates, without opposing it or suppressing it with a heavy hand as it would be obliged to do in the system of total equality. An enlightened government of this kind will do all it can to make moral good (which it correctly values as the greatest good) the rule and guide of eudaimonological good, according to the highest principles of justice. Finally, granted the greatest quantity of net good that can be obtained from society, government will omit no effort to ensure that the greatest possible number of individuals share in this good. Enactments carried out for this end form the third class of governmental actions and means.
627. A summary glance at governmental actions and means shows them to be of three kinds, corresponding to the three aims of government, each subordinate to the other and to be achieved successively.
The first aim of government is to defend the perfect rights of the individual members of the society; the first kind of actions and means a wise government should use are those directed to this purpose.
The second aim is to ensure that the greatest possible quantity of net good, whose value must be wisely estimated, exists in the society; the second kind of actions and means are those taken to achieve this.
The third aim is to bring about the participation of the greatest possible number of individuals in the maximum quantity of good; the third kind of actions and means are those ordered by government to this effect.
Government can consider promoting the production of good only on condition that the rights of all individuals remain inviolate. Similarly, the division of this good among many individuals can be considered only on condition that the quantity of good is not diminished.
628. 1. Government professing these principles promotes the real equality of human beings. Under such government all individuals are equal before the law whether it aims at protecting the rights and good already possessed by individuals, or at promoting the greatest quantity of social good. Here the law acts with the impartiality of a tribunal that does not know the names of the litigants. It invites all equally to compete (286) for social good; it is then the individuals' responsibility to prepare themselves to share in the good. Their favourable stance is partly the work of fortune, that is, of the complex of circumstances independent of human beings, and partly dependent on the action of the virtue and application of the individuals themselves; it is never the task of government. Because of its impartiality, government does not concern itself with individuals as such; it considers and invites them in toto, as one single thing, as humanity.
2. This kind of government is the most favourable to real freedom. It has no intention whatsoever of usurping and abusing nature for its own ends (which is what the ultra-radicals under discussion claim to do). In any case, this is impossible; on the contrary, such government seconds the good operation of nature and is content to remove the obstacles to the development of its seeds. It is a task of negative rather than positive action; good government does not impede but encourages as much as it can all good undertakings.
3. It is government better suited to real progress, for the same reason.
4. It is the most human government of all, because its object is the human species, not the individual.
5. It is the most just and equitable form of government, because it places defence of each individual's ownership before every beneficent act.
6. Finally, it is the most eminently moral government. Although competition for every good is open to all without distinction, virtuous people naturally have the greatest expectation and probability of acquiring eudaimonological good.
Notes
(281) Chap. 9.
(282) I always presuppose that a government will use means which are in themselves licit and result indirectly in the consequences under discussion. It is self-evident that, if we do not wish to destroy natural right, individuals and governments cannot directly inflict the slightest harm whatsoever on an innocent person.
(283) Lk 8: [18].
(284) Cf. Storia comparativa de' sistemi morali, cc. 4-5 where I show at greater length that duty, and its consequent right, cannot be deduced from the tendency to pleasure.
(285) The spirit, if not the clear understanding of these teachings, has penetrated the peoples of modern times. They very often claim the impossible from governments, and when they cannot get it, think they have the right to use force. This explains the movements of nations towards anarchy, although those who encourage such movements are not seeking anarchy. - We could well ask whether, among imperfect rights made perfect, we can include the maxim accepted by English law: `Every Englishman has a perfect right to all that is necessary for subsistence.' This maxim has produced the Poor Tax. - If the principle were not limited to the English but extended to all human beings, it would certainly be more self-coherent. We would have great difficulty in finding a good reason for an Englishman's right to subsistence if the reason for this right were not already possessed by humanity. The question discussed in natural right should perhaps deal with the causes of poverty. If these causes were entirely bad, we would probably have to keep firmly to the principle that `vice alone cannot be the cause of any right.' Thus, according to natural right anyone responsible for his own poverty can apparently be the object of limitless charity but not of strict justice, at least as long as he acts badly.
(286) The word `competition' has been much abused. Free competition for what is good is a human right, but equal competition can only take place when individuals are in the same circumstances.