Society And its Purpose
Book 4 - Psychological Laws and the End of Civil Societies
CHAPTER 17
Continuation — The law governing the progress of the human race
655. If we say that the human race always goes forwards and simply mean that the chain of causes and effects is never interrupted, we should also note that a new cause, human freedom, incessantly reveals itself in human affairs alongside the uninterrupted chain. No matter how limited the action of this cause in human affairs,(291) each of its actions undoubtedly sets off a series of new causes and effects which, like all the other series, perpetuates itself uninterruptedly.
656. But leaving that aside, the chain of causes and effects does not in itself prove the necessity of progress in humanity. To do this we would have to show that the effects of the successive causes are always better than previous effects.
We are told that the continual movement of actions and effects presupposes constant development of nature and the human race. But even the idea of development, as I have said, does not of itself include a continual passage from a less good state to a better state. If we keep to the analogy provided by nature, the opposite would seem to take place: we would seem to have a law of perpetual succession of good and bad states. Although everything that has reached maturity becomes subject to corruption, and dies after passing through the stages of corruption, it is reborn from the seed preserved and fertilised during corruption. Thus, we can reasonably say that nature goes round in ceaselessly changing circles, whereas our philosophers maintain that humanity always progresses in a straight line.
657. Nor can necessary progress in good be proved a priori by recourse to the higher government of divine providence. First of all, we would have to show that such progress is the most conformable to the supreme wisdom and goodness with which Providence guides all events. Although we fully agree that the entire sum of events must be the realisation of a supremely wise and good plan,(292) it would be entirely gratuitous to say that the supposed continual progress in good is undeniably the best realisation of the sublime plan.
Rather, this assertion indicates human short-sightedness, which takes account only of parts succeeding each other and not of the whole in its final completed state. Consequently, we cannot imagine anything better than the need to see the links in the chain of things which pass before our eyes made more attractive and perfect during the short time we see them. But the case is totally different for the supreme Being. Because his purpose is not any transitory state of things but a final optimum state, he acts and governs things in such a way that transitory states must finally result in an ultimate, imperishable state of perfect beauty and perfection. Hence his wisdom is not bound by the childish system of progress which reduces every good to increased perfection in the transitory states of things. The only value these states have in themselves is in relationship to the last state, which they serve as means. So-called necessary progress cannot therefore be proved a priori. Even if it could, it would not provide us with a rule for sound political theory because the action of both human beings and government would be useless in the case of fixed, inevitable progress.
658. These observations, however, are not intended to deny the perfectibility of human beings and of society. It is an important truth and a dogma of Christianity(293) that human beings are continually perfectible. What we completely deny is that their attainment of perfection is necessary and fixed, as the supporters of movement ardently imagine. Thinkers who tried to maintain that progress is rectilinear, rejecting the authority and clear opposition of history, were obliged to interpret events in the strangest way; worse still, they had to exclude (as Condorcet did) the most certain norms of morality, frequently calling `good' the most unspeakable immoralities.(294)
659. `But if humanity is continually moving and developing, what in your opinion is the line which expresses this process?' First of all, we must distinguish the movement of humanity from the movement of individual societies. Even if the movement of all humanity were shown to move forward consistently in a straight line, this would not allow us to form a rule for the good government of particular societies. A State government must carefully encourage its people to move forward in good. If it allowed good to be lost or diminished, the excuse that this was for the benefit of the human race would be useless; the government's administration would still be extremely defective.
660. How then do individual societies and how does the entire body of humanity, make progress? I have said that particular societies continually fluctuate between the two limits of destruction and perfection.(295) The art of good government would seem to consist entirely in avoiding the former and drawing closer to the latter.
The line generally followed by the movement of humanity is classified in three ways:
1. Condorcet makes it rectilinear - I have refuted this.
2. Vico claims that it moves in a circular fashion with periodic regression or going back on itself.(296).
3. Fichte, more subtle than the others and after them, thought that humanity, moving in a spiral, did not go back completely on itself but curved over spaces already covered; certain differences distinguished the former from the latter spaces.
I will say nothing about the first system because it is entirely arbitrary. Relative to the other two, we must first ask whether we are dealing with a movement of humanity within the sphere of moral and eudaimonological good or with merely intellective movement. In the case of moral and eudaimonological good, the problem is so abstruse and multiple that human beings could never be sure if their conjectures were even probable. We will limit ourselves therefore to the movement of humanity within the sphere of intellective development, and to the corresponding external forms of society.
Vico's system is founded on too narrow an observation. He limits himself to the development of the ancient nations. Such an exclusive study of the Latin classics kept him unaware of the social omnipotence of Christianity.
Fichte's opinion is certainly clever. While he allows for the well-known dictum, nil sub sole novum [there is nothing new under the sun], he also acknowledges the equally famous principle: `Things never reproduce themselves in exactly the same way.' Nevertheless the German philosopher's principle is too undetermined; we need to know what spiral he is talking about, and in which direction human society moves in it.
661. My own opinion is that human society, supported by Christianity, moves `in a spiral whose curves become wider and wider; the movement begins near the centre and continues in ever greater spirals, without our being able to assign any necessary limit to their size.' The law governing the ever-increasing size of the spirals is a great question for the History of humanity. But this is not necessary for our present purpose.
(291) Cf. AMS, 650-763 for the limits of human freedom.
(292) The plan of Providence, although formed from eternity, does not violate the truth of human freedom. It is certainly not easy to understand how the predestination of events can be reconciled with freedom. On the other hand, nothing is more obvious for someone who knows the nature of freedom and God's eternal plan. God sees and desires this plan in its final realisation, because all future things are present to him. But the final realisation of the plan involves a state in which human freedom has finished operating; freedom is no longer involved when events have happened - they are necessary. On the other hand, freedom operates before the event, because it consists in the choice of volitions (cf. AMS, 636-646). Freedom and the plan of God therefore are never in opposition or conflict.
The plan of God is the end; freedom, the means with which the plan is executed. It may be objected, `How does God know that a particular means will act to bring about a particular end, if the means is free?' The apparent insolubility of this question consists in the impropriety of the future tense, `will bring about'. God knows not only the will that will act but the will that acts; his knowledge, unlike ours, is not conditioned: omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius [all things are naked and open to his eyes].
(293) `Perfectibility means `able to be perfected'; making perfect is the real attainment of new degrees of perfection.
(294) It is well known how Condorcet claimed to foresee (granted the progress he expected in moral ideas) that human beings would think it very praiseworthy not to deprive themselves of the pleasures of the senses while avoiding the troublesome burden of too many children!
(295) Cf. Introduction of this work.
(296) Vico speaks of nations, but considers them in general