Society And its Purpose
Book 4 - Psychological Laws and the End of Civil Societies
CHAPTER 22
Continuation — The CAPACITY proper to Christian nations is infinite
715. The diminution of happiness in human beings consists in their continual growth of capacity without a corresponding increase of objects to satisfy that capacity. Analysis of the continued growth of capacity of spirit and inability to satisfy it shows how the state of human beings deteriorates, and becomes more dissatisfied and unhappy. Although nature inserts in our spirit an instinct for all we can conceive as good, the actions of this instinct are conditioned to our mental conception of good. Hence, as long as our faculties of knowledge do not develop, the faculties of appetite and desire themselves cannot develop. Each good can be desired only when it is known. Desire is born in us therefore when we want absolutely a good we know, but do not have; the capacity of this desire gradually develops with the knowledge and experience of each good.(312)
716. Through the knowledge and experience of divine things, the capacity of human desire extends infinitely. In fact, the effect of Christianity in the spirit corresponds to the effect produced by Christianity in human intelligence We have seen that Christianity posited an inexhaustible and truly infinite fount of intellective light in the human mind; it raised up an inextinguishable flame, as it were, in humanity. We also saw that the luminous object of Christianity is not some cold, abstract mental conception, incapable of guiding human beings in their actions, but a real, absolute good, suitable for becoming the supreme and very efficacious principle of human activity.(313) Thus, human beings come to know an infinite good and almost in spite of themselves find it occupying their minds because of its extraordinary greatness and intimate, hidden congruity with human nature. It is no surprise therefore that even the capacity of their desire spreads and extends infinitely.
This immensity of desire is the most clearly visible characteristic of Christian nations. Members of the nations previous to Christ never had such a full, absolute concept of happiness as that given to the world by the gospel message. Their happiness was a composite, an assemblage of different kinds of earthly good. A few philosophers saw that the contemplation of truth together with the practice of virtue was necessary for real happiness. But this did not give human beings any positive knowledge of the supreme good. The reason for this is seen in the following reflections.
717. The supreme good offered and promised by Christianity is threefold, that is, it contains real good, intellectual good and moral good, three equally infinite goods but all in a single, totally simple object, God. Christianity further teaches that human beings were destined to enjoy this supreme good in a totally ineffable way, and that a wealth and abundance of good would be revealed to them at the moment the joy was brought to completion. No matter how great and intense their desire, this good and joy would be `what no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived’.(314)
718. The whole of human wisdom was infinitely inferior to these sublime concepts. First of all, no philosopher had ever seen the intimate union of the three elements of true beatitude (that is, absolute real good, absolute ideal good and absolute moral good) all together in a single, excellent nature. This mystery was revealed to the world by Christ alone.
Second, even if human happiness had been seen as a necessary consequence of the three categories of good, the connection between the categories was never found, as I said; human beings had not the slightest idea of it. But granted they did, granted that someone had in fact seen how necessary the three supreme categories of good were for happiness, human philosophy never succeeded, nor could it succeed, in describing these three elements satisfactorily.
719. Relative to the formation of the real element, the only available materials in the human mind were the good of the present life. Without suitable materials, philosophy was confused and at a loss about carrying out the great work of construction. Disagreement between the builders, which soon set in, gave rise to two sects. The first of these saw clearly that feelable good could not be suitable matter for the formation of human happiness, and completely rejected it. Their concept of happiness was ideal and moral, but lacked the real element. Such a concept however is insufficient for human nature, which seeks above all the reality of good. The second sect saw that happiness deprived of reality was too nebulous and beyond human attainment. Thus, they retained temporal good, and in doing so introduced limited, relative good into the concept of happiness. But relative good is incapable of producing happiness; worse still, it is frequently irreconcilable and in conflict with the other two elements of happiness, the ideal and the moral. The result is a happiness whose concept is false, contradictory and discordant. This error is far more serious and simplistic than that of the first sect.
720. Philosophy did no better when forming the concept of the ideal, intellectual element of human happiness. This element consists in the contemplation of truth. Consequently only those who possessed truth fully could have an adequate concept of it. Philosophers, whose knowledge encompassed only a tiny part of truth, rather than truth itself, could only conceive and speak of the contemplation of this little bit of truth. The other part of truth, hidden from their eyes, could not be supplied by their imagination. Their fantasy produced only chimerical compositions which, far from leading to truth, serve to divide human beings from truth. Moreover, philosophical truth is only an abstraction, a tenuous, bodiless idea; Christian truth is simultaneously an idea and solid subsistence, a child of God.
721. The same applies to the moral element. — I showed elsewhere the intrinsic, necessary imperfection of all the moral teachings of antiquity. There can be no perfect teaching about virtue without a perfect concept of supreme, real good. Ancient philosophy, which did not have this concept, could not say what virtue was.(315) Lacking the gentle wisdom of the true, proper concept of moral essence, it could not fuse moral good, which it did not know, with the concept of supreme good. Consequently the concept remained imperfect in all its three parts.
Because no positive concept of absolute good(316) existed before Christ, the corresponding capacity, which is always limited by the imperfection of knowledge, could not be opened up in the human spirit. But once the positive concept of supreme good had been given to humanity, an infinite capacity was opened up in the human heart. This explains why the golden age described by the pagan poets, the happiness which Virgil, the greatest mind of the pagan world,(317) depicted, was considered a frigid, childish song by Christian nations.
722. I should add that there is something even more human in the action of Christianity on the human spirit. It is not simply a case of a concept of supreme good given to humanity, but of a mysterious experience of God himself. This arcane but real communication of God to the human being is the essence of the Christian religion, its principal and fundamental dogma. It holds out to human beings the promise of enabling them to feel God in their soul, and maintains that promise. In fact, if humanity had had no experience of supreme good, it would not have been conquered by Christianity.
The divine author of the Gospel would not have bound all nations to his triumphal chariot, nor would the mental conception of God and of supreme good, which is God, have been positive and efficacious enough to tear the hearts of mortals away from the created universe, raise them up and draw them to God himself — omnia traham ad meipsum [I will draw all things to myself]. Thus there is something deeper and more mysterious than we might think in the lack of contentment of Christian nations, in the insatiability of their desires, and in the portentous and indefatigable activity which drives and stirs them from deep within. At other times human beings were able to find some contentment in nature, which alone stimulated their desires and determined their vague idea of happiness. After Christ, however, natural happiness offers nothing to the expanded heart that finds its rest solely in the supernatural. To be closed within the universe is to feel oneself confined in a narrow prison. The size of the cell is indifferent because the heart now abhors all walls and restrictions.
Notes
(312) The reader should recall what I have said in chapters 12 and 13 about capacity of the spirit.
(313) Cf. bk. 3, c. 223.
(314) Cf. 1 Cor 2: 9.
(315) Cf. Storia comparativa e critica de' sistemi morali, c. 7, a. 3, §7.
(316) Varro's 280 opinions about supreme good show that, in such an important matter, ancient philosophy groped in darkness.
(317) Georg., 2, 467`474. — Hesiod's concept of happiness and the rewards promised by this poet to virtue are also restricted to the pleasure supplied by feeling nature. Theogon., vv. 223–345.