Society And its Purpose
Book 4 - Psychological Laws and the End of Civil Societies
CHAPTER 33
Continuation
825. If we want to see human beings and society advance along the path of well-being, it is necessary to open up capacities within them. These capacities, however, must be capacities for real objects, which alone can satisfy. In addition, those who open these capacities must really possess the means(357) for attaining the real object assigned to the capacities, which unsatisfied would simply torment their spirits. Although, as we pointed out, this may not make people unhappy, it would at least leave them unfulfilled and discontent.
826. Having established these conditions, can we say that stimulating new desires in people or helping them to enlarge their already existing capacities will always be advantageous? If so, what kind of precautions have to be taken? The answer to these questions will present itself of its own accord once we have distinguished the different kinds of desire.
827. First of all, we have to exclude all unsatisfiable desires. These contribute as much to human immorality as to human unhappiness. We must also exclude desires which have a real object lying beyond the power of the means available for attaining it. We are dealing, therefore, only with desires that have a real object, obtainable by means in the power of the persons desiring it. These desires can be divided into two classes. Some are accompanied by a hope which, as human energy and activity increase, provides a foretaste of the good that is hoped for without leaving bitterness or discontent in the spirit. The state of a spirit that desires but does not yet possess its object is devoid of bitterness when there is certain hope of attaining the object and the spirit itself is highly virtuous.
In these conditions, the individual tempers his desire in such a way that it is in complete conformity with the reality of things. In other words, this person has a conditional desire; he desires some good on condition that it will be attained not immediately but at the moment in which he is destined to have it. The desire, made joyous by this hope, and moderated by such light of reason and virtue, does not impede the spirit’s state of contentment. Nothing is lacking to the spirit when its desires are of this kind; it wants to possess its good only on those conditions and at the time it will effectively have it. At present, the spirit is satisfied not to have it but simply enjoy the hope of it.
Such desires are moral and happy. They move human beings to better things while providing them with activity that is simultaneously highly effective and peaceful. Christianity makes virtue originate by means of such desires. The title, `man of desires’, is consecrated in the Bible to indicate a high degree of holiness; the Church does not refuse to be known upon earth as `the field of those who hope’.
Stimulating such desires in the human spirit, which is made more active by such felicitous impulses, can only be praiseworthy. The movement proceeding from desires of this kind is more in keeping with rational and moral nature than any other motion. People pass from a more restricted to a broader state of contentment without ceasing to be content for a single moment. Such desires bring in their wake rest and movement, contentment and activity. If virtuous, happy people permitted nothing else in their heart, they would never cease to increase their own degree of virtue and happiness.
828. Other desires, which form the second of the classes we have indicated, are indeed projected towards a real object proportioned to the means available to the person desiring it, but are accompanied by a probable hope only. In this case, the spirit, if lacking the virtuous moderation of which we have spoken, presses on unconditionally towards the object which it wants to possess as soon as possible. These desires, the most common amongst those found in uncorrupted people, are nevertheless defective and restrictive. As such, they greatly impede full contentment of spirit.
Nevertheless, they are immensely different from the unsatisfiable capacities that constitute unhappiness. In the first place, desires of this kind are finite; if unsatisfied, they do not cause more than finite unrest or pain. Again, if such desires find unforeseen difficulties in securing their object, they grow less as hope grows less, and cease to torment the spirit. They are very different therefore from unsatisfiable desires, which become more agitated and fierce as they encounter difficulties in gaining contentment, and find contentment ever more remote. This happens because unsatisfiable desires have as their end happiness, which human beings cannot renounce. Desires for limited and determined objects, on the other hand, are not necessary; we can easily rid ourselves of them.
829. Third, if the object is attained by means of activity excited by desire, the goodness of the object can compensate for hardship suffered during its absence, and for the efforts needed to possess it. We may want to determine in some way the point at which compensation derived from this good equals or exceeds the hardship caused by its privation. In making this calculation, we first presume that the person with the desire judges correctly the probability or improbability of attaining it. Granted this, the hardship produced in the spirit at each moment is equal to the intensity of the desire,(358) multiplied by the known improbability of attaining the desired good. On the other hand, the pleasure of expectation is equal to the probability of attaining the good, multiplied by the value of the good under consideration. If the hardship is equal to the pleasure of expectation, the two are at the same level. Otherwise, the pleasure of expectation can be greater or less than the intensity of the hardship. In the first case, there is some gain relative to the calculation of enjoyment; in the second, loss.
However, contentment, which is worth more than every gratification, is lacking in the spirit until it possesses the good, or relinquishes its painful desire. The activity of these desires cannot, therefore, be reasonably considered as good for those who have them although, by preparing objects suitable for satisfying capacities later, it may help them or their descendants. From this point of view, government can provide occasions for opening such desires. Government must remember that society, which does not die with individuals, will be able to harvest what has been sown. However, a moral government will permit rather than further this by using negative not positive means.
Notes
(357) Technology is one of the first of these means. The colonists of the United States set out for America taking all the crafts and refined industry of the old world. If we were dealing instead with peoples who acquired civilisation step by step, no desires, however determined, could be aroused in them beyond the limit gradually achieved by their technology, even though the means offered them by nature were immense.
(358) The degree of intensity of desire is relative to a) the good and b) the speed with which it is attained. Sometimes, there is a great desire for some good, unaccompanied by impatience to possess it; sometimes, great hardship is felt in remaining without the good even for a short period, although the desire itself may not be as great as in the first case. Intensity of desire is made up of these two elements.