Society And its Purpose
Book 4
PSYCHOLOGICAL LAWS ACCORDING TO WHICH
CIVIL SOCIETIES MOVE TOWARDS OR AWAY FROM THEIR END
INTRODUCTION
498. The explanation of every social event is found in the human being, the element of society. Everything that happens in nations on a greater scale and in other proportions pre-exists in germ in the minds of the individuals composing the nations. Political science itself, therefore, which teaches governments how to influence societies in order to obtain their end more easily, cannot be brought to perfection, to its ultimate principles, without recourse to psychology.(237) This truth has been enunciated by others,(238) but psychology, or more generally speaking, philosophical teaching about the human being, has been too imperfect until now to provide a sufficiently solid, broad foundation to scientific knowledge of society.
499. My intention is to render the task less difficult and to place the foundations of civil philosophy on the firm ground of scientific knowledge of the human being. And if I am not entirely mistaken, the psychological and anthropological teachings I have already published should be of some help in the matter.
500. In the foregoing books I established that the principal, or rather the unique end of every society, in particular civil society, is contentment of spirit in its members.(239) This great principle is simply an incontrovertible dictate of knowledge of the human being.
501. I also showed that any government which does not direct its measures to this noble end betrays its responsibility and renders the existence of the society useless. On the other hand, if the collective will of the members is not directed to this end, society itself perishes, leaving behind only a lifeless body; the soul, that is, internal, formal society, has departed, leaving behind only external matter.(240) We also saw that this great end constitutes the sole, inalienable and inviolable right of the individuals composing society, that everything opposed to it is illegitimate, and that the principle of natural human freedom is contained in this sublime right of the human being.(241)
502. Furthermore, I analysed contentment of spirit and investigated the means to obtain it. Using the light of history as guide, I concluded that Christianity alone, which offers reliable, stable and sufficient means, is the only true guarantee for human societies and their members; it alone offers and provides complete true human good, the unique, immovable object of human contentment.(242)
503. Finally, I deduced from all this the following political criterion: `Those means of government are good which do not distract society from its final end but help guide it to that end, subordinating the proximate to the final end.’(243) I compared this criterion with my earlier criterion: `Those means of government are good which help to maintain the existence of society, subordinating to this task every concern about embellishments.’(244) I found that both these criteria, in their development and practical execution, gave the same final results. Indeed, if a society diverges from its final end, it ceases to exist formally and even loses its right to exist. Furthermore, even the external, material existence itself of the society owes its stable continuity to the contentment of its members, while the power that supports the society does not change its position except when the contentment of the members changes its object.
504. Moreover, it is clear that as long as the spirit of each citizen is satisfied and content, society necessarily remains at peace; if the members are happy, no thought of change can possibly enter their minds. The illusion of a greater good may perhaps excite them for a moment, but only a generally and constantly painful condition which thoroughly stirs up the masses gives them the power or fury to effect civil revolution.(245)
505. Despite this, nearly all modern writers form an abstract concept of political theory. For them, it is not a discipline directed to the improvement of the human being but one confined to the well-being of the citizen. According to them, a citizen is not a human being but an abstraction, that is, a human being considered solely in his external, material part. Thus, to apply political theory to anything other than material goods is, in their view, to take it beyond its limits. All this clearly demonstrates confusion between the means and the end of political science. The means of government are certainly limited and external, but it is a grave, fatal error to consider the end itself as limited and external, as these authors do. Political theory must deal not only with external goods but everything that contributes to the peace or unrest of the human spirit.
506. We are told that public happiness is the purpose of political science and that such happiness consists in an abundance of external goods. Are there two happinesses, one internal to human beings, the other external? I see only one, dwelling within human beings themselves. I myself would greatly prefer the way common sense sees the matter to these subtle distinctions. Every common-sense person attributes a very simple meaning to `happiness’; we may not be able to define the meaning but we understand it. Moreover, `happiness’ is not definable — what is felt is not capable of definition. Anyone who did not know what it was `to feel well’ could never be taught the meaning of the expression. `To feel well’, `to be happy,’ is something so simple that we can only reply `Yes’ or `No’ when asked, `Do you feel well; are you happy?’ Those who distinguish by answering: `I am happy politically, but unhappy as an individual’ are talking nonsense.
Politicians, therefore must study the real happiness of human beings, in external and internal things. Any politician who said: `I must make the political happiness of peoples, not their private or individual happiness my sole study,’ would be talking nonsense. His efforts could never achieve the happiness of peoples; all his work would be vain words and empty abstractions. The only result of his partial success in accomplishing in the State what he calls public happiness among discontented souls distorted by passion would be the formation of citizens tending to anger, unrest and a desire to avenge his madness. The sole feelings in civil society are those of human nature; without them, no society remains. Civil togetherness is only an acknowledgement and protection of natural bonds, a perfection of the order of nature.
Everything civil in society is an accident added to what is natural in the human being. If we take a rough, dirty, uneducated individual and turn him into a cultured, civilised, well-dressed gentleman, we have an image of natural society become civil. We have not destroyed the individual, who remains what he was, but added accidental good manners. In the same way, society never ceases to be natural; citizens never cease to be human beings. Governments rule real human beings, not abstract beings, and must apply their minds to procuring for the governed the contentment proper to human beings, which alone gives value to civil association. This contentment is unique, even though it seems multiplied endlessly in innumerable abstractions and words.(246)
507. I do not want to conclude from this that the painful state caused by people ready to create unrest, which adds great power to the words of dissidents, is always the direct result of oppressive acts of government. On the contrary, it is sometimes the fatal effect of a change of thought and will in the masses, as we said in the previous book. Laying all the evils of society at the door of government is a grave injustice. A government is no more the author of all social evil than the author of all social good. Nevertheless, it must study and foresee these evils and wisely use whatever is in its power to oppose them. I think governments have collapsed more by failure to forestall public evils than by causing them.
508. Let us retrace our steps. What I have said should indicate sufficiently the intention and purpose of this book, that is, 1. to discover, in the spirit of the individual human being, the laws according to which civil societies move towards or away from their end; 2. to base the theory of social perfection and deterioration on these psychological laws, and 3. to state as corollaries of the theory some practical rules by which governments can evaluate the wisdom or inopportuneness of the enactments within their power. This is the purpose of all that has been said. Let us now delve deeper into these investigations, whose difficult but important nature enables us to appeal to the reader’s kindness and wise discernment.
Notes
(237) Cf. Preface to my political works.
(238) `Destutt-Tracy presented Hobbes as the founder of civil philosophy because Hobbes proposed founding social practice on the systematic knowledge of the human being. Vico wanted to impose laws on history and to reconstruct the first periods of progress in civilisation through the analysis of thought. Romagnosi insisted on the need to unite psychology with history and therefore with scientific knowledge of society' (G. Ferrari, La Mente di G. D. Romagnosi).
(239) Bks. 2 and 3.
(240) Bk. 1, c. 13.
(241) Bk. 2, c. 11.
(242) Bk. 3.
(243) Bk. 2, c. 7.
(244) Bk. 3.
(245) Frederick showed that he knew this when he ascribed the rebellion of the Dutch against the Spanish, and the many changes in the kingdom of Naples and Sicily under Spain and under the Emperor, to this cause: `A satisfied people will never think of rebelling. A happy people is more afraid of losing their Prince, who is also their benefactor, than the sovereign himself fears for the diminution of his power' (Antimach. c. 2).
(246) It should be noted that these observations of mine are not intended to destroy or confuse the limits of the various sciences. I want them to be on good terms so that they do not harm but help each other. When all sciences agree, they become a faithful SINGLE GUIDE for humanity. The methodical distinction of the sciences resembles the distinction between various social offices. The division of labour is always very helpful, but when the different tasks allotted to different people are ordered to form a single whole, each task and each worker must be guided by thought for the whole; one part must be elaborated in proportion to the others so that all are realised together and the whole harmoniously accomplished. Hence, we do not confuse the office of politician with that of writer or of moralist, priest, etc. We affirm that the politician must harmonise with all other social offices and not think himself the sole author of the public good. While he works at a particular part of human happiness, he must not disturb those who are working at other parts. Rather, he must labour at his part so that he contributes to the share of work done with him by all private citizens whose unique end is simple human happiness.