Rosmini’s Theory of Ethics:
Some Considerations

2. The Idea of Being as the
Supreme Rule for
judging about Good in General

We have said that the idea of being is the supreme moral law in Ethics but how is it the supreme moral law. In other words in what way is it the supreme rule with which we judge the morality of actions? To understand this we must first see how the notion of being can be used for judging about good in general and then how it can be used for judging about moral good.

§1. The Nature of Good

Good is that which is desired, and this implies a being capable of desire, for good is a relationship between things and that which desires them. There could be no notion of good without such a being because there would no relationship; a relationship cannot be thought without its two terms.
A being which has the faculty of desiring things must first and foremost desire its own existence and preservation and everything which makes it more perfect and complete. With this faculty of desire a being strives to enjoy the perfection or enhancement the being receives or has received. This includes to delight in oneself and to love oneself with all that is good and perfect in one’s nature. The enjoyment itself is something good for the person experiencing it. We are familiar with this in our desire for good health and the enjoyment which comes with it, in our desire to excel in what naturally draws us, such as the arts and sport. We constantly speak of an athlete improving her or his ability in their chosen area of expertise, or of a good musical performance for example.

It is obvious that if we had never desired or felt any good we could have no notion of it. If we had never experienced pleasure of our own or another nature we could not form an idea of a perfection in any nature. Rosmini reminds his readers again of his theory of knowledge. There is no other way for a feeling being to perceive the perfections of its own nature or any other nature than by feeling them. To be able to think that something is good the feeling must present it to the intellect.(29)

§2. The Origin of our Ideas of Perfections in Things

Rosmini analyses the origin of our idea of perfections. He says that:

1. We first associated pleasant feelings with these perfections, because for us perfection means pleasant feelings taking place or being anticipated in us or in some other sensitive being.

2. We then attributed the concept of perfection to the things we experienced pleasantly, but now without paying attention to their capacity to modify us or any other being. So now the word perfection comes to mean something in itself, independent of the feeling to which it was ordered at the beginning.

3. The intellect notices that the pleasant or painful state of the human body corresponds to a certain order (or disorder) of its parts and this order is considered as perfection in the human body. This is the state of the body co-existent with the pleasant feeling.

4. Similar observations are made with regard to all animate, sensitive beings, and these are seen as perfect with all their parts and everything in them maintains this order which seems to produce for them the most pleasant existence.

We do not attend to this intellectual activity but we readily acknowledge the expertise or well being of a person or animal. The obvious example is good health and bad health. We constantly judge the degree of a person’s health by the diagnosis given to us. We also see that certain conditions disturb this good order. For instance, myxomatosis is an evil condition for the rabbit. Whereas its well-being depends probably on the destruction of farmland. Dutch elm disease was seen as an evil for the trees in question, their good order was disturbed, their beauty damaged and ultimately life taken away.

5. Finally the intellect sees that even inanimate objects are, in varying ways, suitable for serving its needs or those of other sensitive beings, providing the objects have a certain state, form and composition which it accepts as their perfection. We admire architecture, for instance, or a work of art and react with horror if it is damaged. Its order, and therefore perfection, is disturbed.

§3. The Origin of the Order of Being

Now how do we come to know this order intrinsic to things? ‘Order’ is simply a concept of our understanding. When we first form our concepts, the intrinsic order we give to the perfection of beings is deduced from their capacity to produce a constant pleasant feeling for themselves, for us, or for any other thing. Later we form more special concepts because of the difficulty we have of returning to first principles when we want to measure the perfections of the thing. We often take the order as the essence and species of the thing.

Essences

To understand clearly what Rosmini says next we need to have some understanding of his theory on essences. Rosmini defines essence as ‘that which is understood in any idea’.(30) Any determination of the idea of being is called a determined idea and these can be specific or generic. We first acquire the full idea of an imperfect being as it really is with all its deficiencies and qualities . We consider it in its imperfect specific essence. But we can also consider that which makes it what it is, prescinding from its particular qualities (perfections). In the first case I consider a person with all his/her qualities, say, of colour, dimensions and so on. In the second case I consider a person simply as a rational animal. Take away either of these essential elements and he/she would cease to be a human being. We are now considering the person in its abstract specific essence. Finally by a process called integration we can try to think of the person in all its perfection with all the qualities which it needs for this. Of course, we cannot know all that is necessary for the archetype but we try to come close to it. Such an idea would be the (complete) full specific idea, the complete essence of its nature. (The Origin of Thought, nn. 646-652).

Once we have formed the species or essence which presupposes an order beginning with its action on our sensitivity our understanding pays no further attention to the relationship with sensitive beings but concentrates on enjoying

the order as something beautiful and good in itself. If we consider a great piece of music or a well known artistic masterpiece we can see that we admire it for the totality of its perfection, a perfection which we give it because of the delight it produces in us in its final stage. We do not normally analyse our painting philosophically but artistically. On the other hand we can do so and art critics do. The famous ‘tactile’ theory of Bernard Berenson is a case in point. He judged the greatness of renaissance paintings on their ability to enhance our feeling of what the painting portrayed. A good example are the paintings of Giotto and Masaccio. A specific example would be the portrait of the Man (with the blue sleeve) by Titian in the National Gallery where the material of the sleeve induces a sensation of being able to feel the fabric. And the impressionists’ preoccupation with atmospheric effect and colour have revolutionised our appreciation of the countryside and everyday life. The fact, too, that people differ in their appreciation of music, art, food and so on exemplifies the fact that perfection in things is bound up with our sensitivity.

So we approve as good what belongs to the nature of a thing and harmonises with the nature’s principle of existence. Anything opposing this is regarded as evil and disturbs us. We disapprove of anything which tends to destroy a nature and which therefore opposes it. We disapprove, for instance, of the destruction of the Amazon rain forest, not just because of the wanton destruction of the trees themselves, but for the consequent destruction of wild life and the loss of oxygen and addition of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. The unnecessary killing of wild life is another example.

 So:

1. Real beings can be found in a series of different states.
2. Human intelligence, using the relationship with sensitivity, chooses one of these states as perfect, and the type of perfection.
3. In this state the intellect sees an order in which it finds good.
4. The order begins with existence and essence, to which are added the other elements, thus placing the thing in a state of perfection.

All the constitutives of a nature have a single end, a perfect state to which they unfailingly tend. This is the complete essence of the nature. But our thought can fix itself on the essential necessary order of being which is necessary to being. Every essence is being, but more determined, limited and actual than being as such.

Perfections, or endowments of things are synonyms for good. We think of them as causes of pleasant sensations but we can think of them independently of their effect as something real, objective and active. Things possess their perfections and what is good in the same way as they possess being. These endowments, and all that is good in a thing, are everything that harmonises with the thing’s perfect existence in other words, all that tends to give to the thing it fullness of being. In this imperfect world contingent beings fall short of attaining this perfect state but the tendency and potentiality is there. We speak of people not fulfilling their potential when we see that they have talents which either lie dormant or are only partially used. Others are so gifted that they have to choose which endowments to develop and which not. This is a limitation in the present order of things.

The abstract essence of a thing, that which makes it what it is, its first act, sets the programme, the direction, the end to which the forces of the thing are directed. Evil is everything which is opposed to this order. We sometimes ask what Mozart’s music would have been like if he had lived to a ripe old age. More pertinently when we see a person’s life cut off in its prime we exclaim ‘what a waste!’(34)

Good is identical with being. When the intrinsic order of a being’s actuation and development demands some addition, the addition is good; when it excludes something, what is excluded is evil.

§4. Conclusion

An analysis of the word ‘good’ shows us that the being of every nature has an intrinsic order determining the necessity of qualities which become what is good and perfect for that particular nature. When we know the order possessed by its being and expressed in its essence then we know its good, or value of grade of perfection. The order is understood in the idea and the more perfect the idea the better understood is the order. We can know how much of the order has been realised and how much is missing and needed for its completion. Knowledge of a thing’s order of being is knowledge of its goodness. Since being and good are the same, knowledge of being must be knowledge of good. Being has only to be considered in its intrinsic order for it to be called ‘good’.

Summary

1. The notion of good consists in the relationship between the things desired and that which desires them.

2. A being with this faculty of desire, desires its own existence and preservation and everything which makes it more perfect and complete. It desires the perfection of its own nature and the qualities or perfections which go to make this nature perfect.

3. To think that something is good the feeling must present it to the intellect.

4. There is a strict relationship between the perfection of a nature and the desire for it. Sentient desire is necessary for the existence of this perfection. Perfection and sense are inseparable.

5. Perfection means an order intrinsic to things, corresponding to their most desired state. We often take the order as the essence of the thing. We approve as good anything which belongs to the nature of a thing . The order begins with essence and existence to which are added the other elements needed for the perfection of the thing.

6. When we know the order possessed by a nature’s being and expressed in its essence then we know its good, or value of grade of perfection. This order is understood in the idea.

7. Knowledge of a thing’s order of being is knowledge of its goodness. Knowledge of being must be knowledge of good.

8. A nature has a perfect typical state to which it unfailingly tends. Our thought can fix itself on the essential necessary order of being.

9. Perfections or endowments of beings are synonyms for good. We think of them as causes of pleasant sensations, but we can think of them independently of their effect as something real, objective and good.

10. These endowments are what tends to give the thing its fullness of being

11. Everything is good in so far as it is and evil in so far as it is not.

12. Good is identical with being. Good is ‘being considered in its order’; it is being as felt, in relationship with the intelligence. The idea of being is the notion, rule and principle with which I measure and identify the good of all the natures I perceive and know.

Notes

(29) We human beings think and feel. Observation reveals that there are two kinds of feeling, internal and external. The internal fundamental feeling of my own body, unaffected by external forces acting on it, is simple and characterised by total lack of extension. But when it is acted upon by external bodies, for instance, it is modified and these modifications or sensations constitute the material part of our knowledge. The idea of being allows us to known the various modes of being through sense experience. These determinations come from the various sensations through which we are modified by the action of external things on us. These take place within the unity of the human subject. ‘Myself’ the principle which knows that something is a being, is the same principle which experiences action within itself, because feeling is an action of being. In this way we intellectually perceive external bodies and form our ideas of them. We affirm ‘a something exists ‘.We are persuaded of the existence of a real being.

(30) Note that there is no such thing as a real essence! Greenness or slimness do not exist by themselves. We do not talk about a greenness or a slimness but of a green leaf or a slim person. These qualities only exist in a real thing but not apart from it. They are therefore concepts of the mind which can consider them apart from the reality in which they subsist as qualities.

(31) Principles of Ethics, note 23.

(32) Op. Cit., n,36.

(33) The Origin of Thought, n. 648.

(34) We are of course prescinding from the spiritual aspect and the providential will of God.

(35) Principles of Ethics, note 41.

(36) Rosmini quotes St Thomas, ‘Good and being are really the same but differ conceptually. The concept of good comprises the thing as desirable. It is clear that everything is desirable in so far as it is perfect because all things desire their own perfection. But anything is perfect, in so far as it has the act of being. Hence a thing is good in so far as it is a being, because being is the actuality of everything’ (S.T., I, q. 5, art. 1.). Op. cit., n. 42.

(37) Principles of Ethics., n. 45.