CHAPTER 4
13. The third cause of obscurity in written work, according to Victorinus, is the difficulty and immensity of the subject: ex rei magnitudine. When a book contains clear ideas presented in exact language, its author and the book itself are not truly obscure, despite difficulty on the part of an unprepared or malicious reader. On the other hand, the book may be obscure because of the difficulty and sublimity of its subject, without fault on the part of the writer. The work may be written clearly from the point of view of ordered material, logical reasoning and careful use of terms, yet still remain obscure from the point of view of content, which the author has endeavoured to clarify.
Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between the difficulty of a subject and its obscurity. The former gives rise to obscurity, but only relatively to less able intelligences. This is not absolute, true obscurity, which is found in the subject-matter itself only when no human intelligence can ever fully resolve and remove it.
14. Difficulty, but not always obscurity, is found in many problems dealing with the nature of corporeal and spiritual beings. Everyone knows that studies in physics, mathematics and metaphysics present immense difficulties to the human mind. It would be foolish and barbarous, however, to want to ban the study of these subjects because of their difficulty, or to eliminate them from ordinary life on the pretext that they are as dark and obscure as the minds considering them. Civilisation and human society have been able to make progress only through the labours of those subjecting themselves to the work entailed in studies of this kind. The natural instinct of human intelligence stimulates people to bring greater pressure to bear where there are greater difficulties to overcome. Once conquered, difficulties often reveal a precious source of hidden teaching. Moreover St. Augustine rightly observes that ‘what is sought with difficulty is sweeter when found.’(14) * {OLR}
15. Are we confronted with intrinsic obscurity in the natural sciences, or only with difficulties? It is not altogether easy to reply to this question. What has often seemed exceptionally hard and insoluble has been overcome with time and perseverance, and the results themselves have presented various degrees of difficulty. Unsolved, the problems may have seemed totally obscure, but their solution has dissipated the obscurity and given rise to lesser obstacles to understanding. Generally speaking, therefore, it has to be said that the natural questions human intelligence can solve are indeed difficult, but only relatively obscure for mankind. They possess no intrinsic obscurity in our regard. The same may be said about true solutions to the same problems: although they may still present difficulties, they are not as a result obscure. It is true that insoluble enigmas may remain in the order of nature. As the Bible says: ‘God has made everything suitable for its time; moreover he has put a sense of past and future into their minds, yet they cannot find out what God has done from the beginning to the end.’(15) *{OLR} But this is the only source of the real obscurity of these subjects, constituting as it does the foundation and base of all human knowledge.
True, intrinsic obscurity in the content of human enquiry is much more dense in the depths of the revealed truths of our faith, which is full of profound mysteries. For this reason, knowledge of these truths outweighs other knowledge in dignity and worth, ‘because this branch of knowledge is principally about matters which by reason of their height transcend reason,’ as St. Thomas observes,(16) {OLR} in words indicating the source of the precious, intrinsic obscurity of faith.
16. However, although we now behold divine matters per speculum et aenigmate [in a mirror, dimly], as long as we remain in the present life, we do see something of them. Faith does not propose total darkness for our belief, but light and darkness together. The dark, obscure part of faith can gradually be diminished on our side by the divine light we obtain through prayer and by unceasing meditation. At the same time, we can open our eyes and focus them better on the luminous aspect, although the veil can never be totally removed.
This is the wise plan, God’s economy, according to which man has been instructed about the things necessary for eternal bliss. St. Augustine thus expresses the same concept: ‘The height of the word of God calls us to work hard; it does not denigrate our understanding. If all were closed, there would be nothing obscure to be revealed. Again, if all were covered, the soul would be without nourishment and without strength with which to knock at what is closed.’ (17) {OLR}
The dark side of revealed wisdom is proper to faith, the luminous aspect to understanding. I have dealt elsewhere with the order in which these two paths of the human mind progress (Theodicy, Book 1, Introduction). Here, I wish to note that what is mysterious and dark in holy doctrine does not prevent the possibility and the necessity of searching within it, with humility and piety, for the light of understanding. Whatever we succeed in grasping, much or little though it may be, is the most precious part of human knowledge. As Aristotle says, ‘the least we acquire in knowledge about the highest things is more desirable than the knowledge we hold with unshakeable certainty about lower matters.’(18)
17. The truths contained in the deposit of faith were, therefore, the object of constant meditation and unceasing study in the Church, especially by holy bishops in her early days. They responded to the Apostle’s command to Timothy: ‘Take heed to yourself and to your teaching; attend to the public reading of scripture, to preaching, to teaching.’(19) *{OLR} The need to reply to heretics also obliged shepherds and teachers of the flock to use their intellectual powers to penetrate the truths of faith, to express them more explicitly and distinctly, and to order and harmonise them. Their conscientious work reflected the truth of JESUS’ words, ‘Every scribe who has been trained for the kingdom of heaven brings out of his treasure what is new and what is old.’ In this way the truths of faith were enriched, as time passed, through the efforts of holy and learned men, and above all through the dogmatic decisions of the Church. These truths, as they took on unity in design, order and method, came to form the branch of knowledge known as sacred theology.
18. Consentius, who had written to St. Augustine persuaded that veritatem ex fide magis quam ex ratione percipi oportere [truth should be perceived through faith rather than reason], nevertheless asked him in the same letter to use the light of his great mind to unfold to him the teaching on the Trinity. In his reply,(20) St. Augustine showed that his request, although not unreasonable, was not in keeping with what Consentius had first said in his letter. Rather, his first opinion, which detracted too much from reason, needed to be modified: ‘First, see if what you ask harmonises with your previous definition.’(21) *{OLR} ‘If I am to do what you want,’ he declares, ‘and help you to penetrate the mystery as far as possible, I have to do so by following reason itself. Nor when I have brought you a little into the understanding of such a secret (which I cannot do in any way without inner help from God) will I be doing anything other than reasoning, as far as I can.’*(22) {OLR}
With these words Augustine shows Consentius how to modify his opinion which attributed everything to authority alone, while retaining authority and at the same time trying to penetrate truths believed unshakeably on the authority of God who reveals. ‘So if you, not unreasonably, ask me or any other teacher how to understand what you believe, correct your definition not for the sake of rejecting faith but in order also to behold with the light of reason what you already hold with solid faith.’*(23){OLR}
St. Augustine goes on to show that, with faith presupposed as an inescapable and immobile foundation, it is highly praiseworthy to apply the faculty of reason, and natural reasoning itself, to revealed dogmas in order to draw from them greater light for the understanding. God is very pleased with this: ‘It cannot be that God hates in us the very thing by which he has made us more excellent than other living beings. It cannot be, I say, that we believe in such a way that we neither accept nor seek what is rational. We could not even believe unless we had rational souls.’*(24) {OLR}
After explaining the intimate relationships that bind reason and faith, and the rules to be followed in the use of both, he distinguishes true reason from false, that is, from that which is not reason at all. He then declares that the person who not only believes, but understands with true reason what he believes, is in a better position than one who believes without understanding, although he desires to understand. If, in fact, he did not desire to understand, he would not even know the purpose of faith. Its final aim is vision, that is, perfect intelligence. ‘Again, the person who understands truly what previously he only believed is in a better position than the one who still desires to understand what he believes. But if he does not even desire to understand, and thinks that what is to be understood is only to be believed, he is unaware how faith is of assistance in this matter. Pious faith does not wish to be bereft of hope and charity. The faithful believer, therefore, must believe what he does not yet see in such a way that he may hope and love the vision.’*(25) {OLR}
He also says that here on earth certain souls must be content with faith alone and with the light which, very precious and extremely helpful, it brings in its wake, while they hope and desire that one day they will understand what they have been promised. But he warmly exhorts others to devote themselves to reflection and thought about God, and about divine, revealed truths, despite their difficulty and profundity.
19. What seems to merit greatest attention, however, is the sign given by Augustine for recognising those who have the capacity for undertaking this kind of study and, by philosophising about God, adding more light, through good use of the speculative mind, to what is taught by authority. The standard is this: their capacity for arriving at an understanding of that which forms pure mind, pure intelligence. Only knowledge of the nature of the mind, an element of our soul, can be applied to the Creator in such a way as to make possible some kind of reasoning about the Being who is above all creation. Those who cannot grasp this doctrine of the mind and intelligence should be content with faith; their souls falter in their own sight, and fail to recognise what is best in themselves, that is, their intellectual element. As Augustine states in setting out with great accuracy the single, true base of Christian philosophy: ‘If we consider the soul in this way, that is, especially as human and rational and intellectual, and made according to his image, and we find that it does not overwhelm our thoughts and understanding, but that we are able to grasp with our mind and understanding its foundation, that is, our very mind and understanding, it will not perhaps be absurd for us to contemplate its being brought, with God’s help, to the understanding of its Creator. But if the soul is incapable of this, and feels itself falling, let it be satisfied with pious faith as long as it journeys to God. One day that which has been promised will come about in us through him “who by the power at work within us is able to accomplish abundantly far more than all we can ask or imagine”.’*(26) {OLR}
20. There is profound wisdom in this principle according to which Augustine declares that those incapable of forming for themselves a true concept of the nature of the human mind and intelligence are unsuited to rational speculation about divine matters. Careful examination shows that all the errors of philosophers and heretics about God and the Trinity (and some of them were gross indeed) have their origin in their authors’ ignorance of the nature of the mind and the intelligence. They formed their concept of it from the likeness to it which they found in things inferior to it; they did not grasp it directly, as it is in itself. And yet they wanted rashly to reason about the things of God.
St. Augustine’s teaching takes us even further. He is not content with encouraging us to desire and struggle to reach, as far as humanly possible, through reason combined with prayer, some understanding of the extremely difficult and sublime things that we believe; nor does he think it sufficient to point out the condition on which this can be done, or the principle from which we have to start, that is, an accurate and true theory of the mind and of human knowledge, according to which we are made in the image and likeness of God. He also determines and establishes with great accuracy what is most sublime in our mind and intelligence. From this culminating point we can, he says, more securely reach out in thought to God, and come to know him more scientifically.
In our mind and intelligence, the lower part is made up of ourselves who use the mind; the higher, superior part is the light, impressed upon us by God himself, by means of which we know and judge all things. This light of human reason and intelligence is such that it is not absurd, when we have grasped it, to behold it ascending to God, ad suum quoque auctorem intelligendum [to understanding of its Creator]; this is the light continually infused into the human soul by him qui illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum [who enlightens everyone coming into this world]; this is the starting point for all sound philosophy in its application to divine matters. But we should hear from Augustine himself the magnificent description he gives of this light as a reflection of the divine face. He presents and analyses it in the following way: ‘This very light, by which we discern all these things, in which the unknown that we believe is sufficiently clear to us (in so far as it precedes faith), in which we hold what we know, remember the shape of the body that we claim to know, grasp what bodily sense presents us with, imagine how the spirit is like the body, and contemplate with the understanding what is certainly dissimilar to all bodies — this very light, in which all these things are judged, is not diffused through local spaces in the same way as the splendour of our sun and of corporeal light, nor does it enlighten our mind with some kind of visible clarity. Invisibly and ineffably, but nevertheless intelligibly, it shines before us and is as certain to us as all those things which it makes certain to us and which we behold through it.’*(27) {OLR}
According to Augustine, this light, corresponding to the principium quo of the Scholastics, is the source from which man draws all ideas and knowledge;*(28) {OLR} it is that in which and through which true judgments are formed about all things;*(29) {OLR} and finally, it contains the principle of certainty, and is itself most certain.*(30) {OLR}
St. Augustine wants us to study and investigate the most difficult matters, as far as this is possible; he wants us to make every effort to obtain the greatest possible degree of understanding; but at the same time, he indicates the path we should follow and the principle from which we should start if we do not wish to labour in vain. We have to begin by meditating and understanding the light of our intelligence, wherein lies the origin of our ideas and the certainty of our judgments.
Notes
(14) Exposition on Psalm 103, serm. 2, n. 1.
(15) Eccles 3: 11.
(16) S. T., I, 1, 5.
(17) On the Words of the Apostle, serm. 13, n. 1.
(18) On the Parts of Animals, 1, 9.
(19) 1 Tim 4: 16; ibid., 13.
(20) Letter 120, n. 2.
(21) Letter 120.
(22) [Letter 120].
(23) [Ibid.].
(24) [Ibid.].
(25) [Ibid.].
(26) [Ibid.].
(27) [Ibid.].
(28) [Ibid.].
(29) [Ibid.].
(30) [Ibid.]