CHAPTER 10
The theological and logical rules to be followed
in judging
the waywardness or soundness of a Catholic writer
59. As long as the Church has not passed judgment on the waywardness or soundness of the teaching of a Catholic writer, private theologians must abstain from inconsiderate censure of the author, although there is nothing to prevent their offering to the public a balanced and objective opinion. For a theological judgment to be true, it must be proposed by a person who follows certain logical and theological rules, in addition to those required by courtesy and charity.
These norms have been the object of much learned discussion, and in their wisest expression have been followed by Roman censorship, and sanctioned or explained by Benedict XIV in his Bull Sollicita or in his De Canonisatione Sanctorum.
We need not go into them in detail, therefore, but confine our examination to the fundamental principle, found in the Fathers of the Church, governing a theological judgment. Afterwards, we can add the four rules suggested for ecclesiastical censors by Lamindo Pritanio in his book, De Ingeniorum Moderatione, quoted often by Benedict XIV.
The principle to be kept in mind by theologians undertaking to censure an author arises as a corollary of the relationship of Christian freedom to points of doctrine. As we have said, Christ did not tie his teaching to determined forms or words, but simply entrusted the deposit of his doctrine to the Church. He left it to be unfolded and announced in every tongue and in every possible form of language, style and eloquence, on condition that it remained identical and entire, without the addition of any really new item, or the loss or omission of any other.
This holy, splendid freedom left by Christ to the reverent understanding of those believing in his word gives rise to the following corollary: as Christian doctrine is not to be found only in the words it employs, but in the sense contained in the words, so too error and heresy does not consist in the words or forms used, but in what they mean. The Fathers and ecclesiastical writers are all fully agreed about this.
St. Hilary points to this truth when he shows that holy Scripture is not found in its material phrases, but in the understanding of the doctrine they contain. Heretics can read the written words, but they do not penetrate to the doctrine: ‘Scripture has to be understood, not simply read.’*(100) {OLR} Jerome says the same: ‘Scripture has to be understood, not simply read. Otherwise, if we follow the letter, we ourselves could make up new dogma.’*(101) {OLR} St. Augustine also observes that heretics do not despise the letter of Scripture in their possession; their error consists in not possessing the doctrine contained in the letter: ‘They are heretics not because they despise what the Scriptures contain, but because they do not understand them.’*(102) {OLR} Finally, St. Athanasius observes that as far as possible heretics conceal their errors under the very words of Scripture: ‘The devil, the author of heresies, because of the ill savour which attaches to evil, borrows Scripture language as a cloak wherewith to sow the ground with his own poison also, and to seduce the simple.’*(103) {OLR}
These examples show that it is not sufficient for an author to use Catholic phrases or words, and other uncensurable expressions, in order to forestall criticism. His work has to be examined at greater depth, and the whole of his arguments taken into consideration. Only the entire context will show whether the argument contains unsound doctrine. Cicero expresses this rule of logic when he says of philosophers: ‘They are not to be considered on the basis of their vocabulary, but by reason of their perspicacity and constancy.’*(104) {OLR}
But if this principle can be validly employed to uncover error hidden in a sheath of words, it must also be used with respectful care for recognising the truth in Catholic writers, and in all devout writing, even that inspired by God. Hence St. Hilary can add (and this is another part of the same principle): ‘Heresy is about understanding, not about written words. We are dealing with wilfully mistaken meaning, not with speech.’*(105) {OLR} St. Ambrose agrees: ‘The letter is not mistaken; no fault is to be found in the written word; it is the meaning which is at fault.’*(106) {OLR} And St Hilary synthesises the two parts of the principle: ‘The understanding of what is said is to be found in the cause of what is said. What we talk about is not to be subject to the word, but the word to what we talk about.’*(107) {OLR} The ‘cause of what is said’ is to be understood as the author’s entire purpose, which is demonstrated through his complete context, his accurate comparison with parallel passages, his definitions of words, and by means of every indication provided by hermeneutics and sound criticism.
In principle, therefore, it is the teaching which merits approval or censure, not its forms and words unless they prejudice the teaching or conceal error, or alter the truth through poor exposition.
62. We can now set out the four rules suggested by Lamindo Pritanio in the book we mentioned.
The first rule. ‘Ecclesiastical censors do indeed have to take suitable precautions about every innovation in opinions and terminology, but not in such a way that they immediately judge as new everything which seems new to them. Nor should they imagine that what really is new is to be condemned out of hand because it is new.’*(108) {OLR}
The author adds the following comment to the first rule. He first shows how the theological censor has to be cautious, and careful not to permit in the books he censures any godless innovation that may depart in the least from Catholic dogma. But he also insists on the necessity of sound doctrine in the censor. Without it, ignorance could easily lead him to abuse the first rule: ‘Note, however, that ignorance can easily abuse this rule. Everything seems new to the unlearned, who were previously ignorant of what they are now reading. It would be ridiculous, and a sin against justice if, because of their ignorance, they want to rej ect these things, or overlay them with suspicion. It is obviously harmful that the studies of learned men should be hidden
away because they do not suit the palates of certain people. Censors and judges, rather than silence the learned, should take care to investigate whether these things are both new and dangerous.’*(109) {OLR}
The second rule. ‘A prudent person does not tolerate books and discourses which can give rise to scandal; but it is equally true that a prudent person should not suppress the power that intelligent people and writers have of tracking down error and superstition and thus preventing these evils from flowing without hindrance throughout the Church.’*(110) {OLR}
Here, the learned writer shows that authors are not to be tolerated who reprove abuses so discourteously, imprudently and boastfully that they cause people to hate and despise the holiest things. On the other hand, he also shows that those uncovering and attacking abuses zealously, knowledgeably and prudently have to be granted a certain freedom in their war on matters that, within ecclesiastical circles, can cause great damage to the kingdom of God on earth: ‘When this is done modestly and prudently, no one will begrudge such necessary medicine to the Church. But why do you so easily forbid publication to their writings, or insist that they be withdrawn from the public? False accusations of impiety are made against practically all the ancient works of the holy Fathers. Indeed, we can read in their works such sharp discourses against corrupt clerics and monastic customs, against superstitious and pious practices, and against licence in opinions and vices in prelates that we would not want to repeat them. But no scandal resulted, and no one censored them. We have become so delicate that we cannot tolerate the slightest disturbance, and are always afraid of the evil pressing on us from without.’*(111) {OLR}
The third rule: ‘A prudent person tries to weigh all things carefully so that he may, as far as possible, condemn the error or cause of error in books. But the prudent person, who wishes to act cautiously in these matters, also takes note of the scruples, quibbling and acerbity which he may find in himself.’*(112) {OLR}
In this rule the author praises careful censors who reject error, and everything else that could cause error or vice, but he expects this laudable attention to be free from three defects: scruples, quibbling and acerbity. In order to avoid misunderstanding, he goes on to describe each of them in detail. First, scruples: ‘For me, scruples consist in suspecting heresy on all sides, and in constant fear that heresy may inflict damage on religion, or that contempt and hatred be caused towards our venerated predecessors or against sacred things, or that readers be faced with error to the detriment of their morals.’*(113) {OLR}
Then quibbling: ‘For me, quibbling consists in always wanting to accept in the worst way whatever seems to offer an easy, solid meaning and to lead most conveniently to an explanation consonant with upright, correct faith.’*(114) {OLR}
Finally, acerbity: ‘Acerbity means having the kind of spirit that wishes to place obstacles to the publication of books, or suppress those works which can easily be amended. Or the spirit that wishes, out of misplaced sincerity towards holy Church, to deal totally inflexibly with authors, to deter them from writing and frequently to undermine their work and good name without sufficient cause. These authors do no harm to the Church or to readers however strongly, sharply and freely they write. Writing and distributing books of this kind is of great assistance to the well-being of peoples and the Church.’*(115) {OLR)
The fourth rule for balanced censorship: ‘A prudent person tries, as far as possible, to keep at a distance things which may cause harm, provided he does not deprive the Church or the State of a remedy greater than the danger, or block some greater utility.’*(116) {OLR} The author illustrates this rule with several examples, one of which I shall quote. He insists that if history were compelled to be silent about the errors and public vices of rulers, even of our ecclesiastical rulers, the prohibition would do the Church and public affairs more damage than good. But criticism has to be offered without rancour, from love of what is true and good, and with courteous reverence and charity: ‘If the faults the writer points to are true, and anger or denigration are not the author’s motive, freedom of this kind and care for the truth are sometimes to be tolerated. Moreover, senior people in the Church, and ecclesiastics of any kind, should be reminded that their own good name is at stake. This will act as a brake on their asking what is impossible and on other sordid vices proper to worldly people.’*(117) {OLR}
After affirming that many of the Church’s highest dignitaries were unfortunately subject to these vices, he adds: ‘If we are going to write about what these people did, is it lawful to describe them as other than they were? Is their good name to be boosted by adulation?’*(118) {OLR} And he makes the following objection: ‘But these things are to be passed over, you say. Yes, I would agree, if they are faults of a private person and are guiltless relative to the people and religion; if nothing useful is served by their revelation, and even more if revelation could harm the State; and again, if these guilty persons are still alive. If, however, the crimes are public and connected with religious and ecclesial business, and their dead perpetrators have been placed in the pillory, it would perhaps be more useful for the benefit of the State if these human vices were brought to light rather than dissimulated. Vice will exist as long as there are human beings, but it should be accused and disapproved and its horror impressed upon human beings lest it roam about unpunished. Those who come after will learn from the example of their predecessors what is to be done. They will also learn respect for their own good name if, while respecting the living, they treat all the dead equally, and acknowledge the baseness they exp ress under quite different app earances. It is sometimes useful to the Church and the State that these things should be made known.’*(119) {OLR}
He supports his case with the example of Baronius, a free, impartial historian.
I have quoted these long passages from this learned, devout and illustrious writer because I could never have expressed myself so ably and with such holy zeal. Moreover, his authority gives greater weight to teaching that harmonises so well with the common sense of theologians and of mankind in general.
Notes
(100) Against the Emperor Constantius, 2, 9.
(101) Dialogue against the Luciferarians.
(102) Letter 120, n. 13.
(103) Against the Arians, Orat. 2.
(104) Tusc., 5, 4.
(105) The Trinity, 4, 9.
(106) On the Faith.
(107) The Trinity, bk 4, 14.
(108) On moderating able people in religious matters, 2, 6.
(109) [Ibid.].
(110) [Ibid.].
(111) [Ibid.].
(112) [Ibid.].
(113) [Ibid.].
(114) [Ibid.].
(115) [Ibid.].
(116) [Ibid.].
(117) [Ibid.].
(118) [Ibid.].
(119) [Ibid.].