INTRODUCTION
Stresa, 29th October, 1854
1. Modern disbelief, the offspring of 16th century Protestantism, first took root in Holland before passing through England to France, which it shook to its foundations. From France it spread throughout Europe. Its immediate aim, sought with indefatigable energy, was the destruction of Catholicism, which would depend in the first place upon the overthrow of Scholastic philosophy, a willing assistant and companion of the theology with which it had come to maturity.
The spirit of disbelief did all it could to divide reason from faith. It purported to show these two guides of mankind at odds with one another, and pretended to use the weapons proper to reason to combat faith. However, because reason and philosophy, if they are to be worthy of these names, cannot be out of step with faith, disbelief could succeed in its aim only by undertaking the destruction of philosophy in the schools through mockery and sophistry. Disbelief intended to deprive philosophy of the sublime truths upon which its existence is based, in particular of teaching about God, about the soul, and about the nature of intelligible things, upon which the knowledge of God and of the soul depend.
As a result, mankind was deceived into accepting as philosophy a disorganised mass of material knowledge and fallacious arguments. Disbelief was free to parade before the whole world under the name of philosophy, or philosophers, while only a phantasm of philosophy remained in the schools. Although pure materialism was proposed in vain, unbelievers were happy enough to formulate and synthesise all philosophical
knowledge under the headings of sensism and subjectivism. The first of these systems makes truth a human sensation, and the second transforms God himself and the world into creatures of the human spirit. These so-called systems became the arsenals from which weapons were drawn to attack every truth in religion and morals. Souls were savaged in immense numbers because the battle was waged against a disarmed generation incapable of defending itself.
Religion cannot in fact defend itself without solid, truthful philosophy. As Leo X said in the 5th Lateran Council, what is true cannot be opposed to what is true; every objection dependent upon reasoning by the enemies of the faith can be answered by reason only. Wisely, therefore, he encouraged philosophers to combat the errors of their time by setting reasoning against reasoning.
2. The Catholic Church, in her desire to overcome the objections of unbelievers and, with equal urgency, to organise revealed truths and penetrate their understanding, has always protected philosophical study, and stimulated those who cultivate and promote it for the same ends. For this reason, estimable religious men, including the great Cardinal Sigismund Gerdil, undertook the difficult task of restoring sound philosophy from the ruin to which it had sunk under blows inflicted by the enemies of religion when disbelief disguised itself as philosophy. Such restoration has also been my aim in my published works, as I have stated more at length in the introduction to them.
3. The style and method proper to philosophical work was therefore in keeping with the aim and the arguments I had in view. Even the theological subjects treated in passing (it is impossible to prescind from them entirely in a complete system of philosophy) took on a philosophical aspect, and progressed through the analyses, distinctions and arguments proper to philosophical discussion. This, however, gave rise to an awkward and unexpected difficulty on my part.
On the one hand, I found myself encouraged by the support of many learned men, amongst them some holding positions of the highest dignity in the Church, who raised my hope that my religious aim was in part succeeding. On the other hand, some theologians did not sufficiently understand subjects treated in
this way, and thought there were serious errors in what I had written. They made this clear to the public in a great number of books, and denounced my works as erroneous to the holy apostolic See. The Pope ordered the Sacred Roman Congregation of the Index to examine the works thoroughly, and a short time ago they were declared free from any solid foundation for accusation. (1) What seemed harmful, God turned to good.
4. Despite the dissipation of grave doubts about the soundness of the teaching, some wise and honourable persons were still hesitant about the possible obscurity of these philosophical works with their new language, and thought it might be of help, at least to less understanding readers, if certain points proper to theology, or common to theology and philosophy, were clarified. No particular proposition or expression was indicated, but general comments were made about the very difficult doctrine on original sin and human freedom where, it seemed, greater clarification and more common theological language could be helpful. It is true that writings gain in understanding in so far as they reach the end intended by their authors, and this is especially the case, even for less learned people, if they leave no doubt whatsoever in the minds of their readers when dealing with delicate and important subjects bordering upon our holy faith.
Out of respect for these opinions, I have decided to introduce this new edition of my moral writings with a study of the suggested obscurity and novelty of language in them, and to attempt to clarify the two points mentioned above in order to satisfy all those who are one with me in loving pure, Catholic teaching, and in desiring what is good.
5. Several ways occur to mind of carrying out this duty, to which charity and love of progress in truth impel me. Perhaps the shortest and most helpful is to divide the study into two parts.
First, I shall set out in general the principles and duties of any writer, but especially of one having to deal with theological matters. Here we shall be concerned with clarity, propriety and consecrated use of language. Because the principles and duties I have in mind are those upon which all writers have to be judged,
there will be no need to speak about my works in this first part. We shall be examining generalities only.
In the second part, I shall begin by offering a brief synthesis of the teaching I have expressed on freedom and on original sin.(2) I hope that this compendium, set out in clearer words commonly used by Catholic theologians, will provide my kind critics with a satisfactory résumé of the system, and that they will be able to recognise in it the clarifications they desire.
The compendium should serve as a key to an easy understanding of the teaching, developed and sustained more at length elsewhere by philosophical reasoning. After this I shall be able, for the sake of greater clarity, to expound the reasons which forced me to write as I did, leaving matters in apparent obscurity for those whose unfamiliarity with philosophical writers leads them to think that my style and way of reasoning is new.
May God grant that I may entirely remove every shadow of suspicion and doubt from the minds of the learned theologians with whom I am arguing and who, without any other ulterior end, want only what I want. May the effort I make show them my desire not only to profess sound doctrine, but to express it clearly and exactly, as far as I can, so that no faithful Christian may have any doubt about what I think.
Notes
(1) [Cf. Foreword, p. viii ].
(2) [Cf. Foreword, p. vii].